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Abstract 
 
This project aimed to create a plug-and-play protocol for Body Area Networks (BANs). This 
protocol enables communication between a diverse number of devices and a base station, regardless of 
equipment manufacturer. Previous BANs rely on either proprietary software, or protocols that are 
specialized to the physical device. This protocol takes a more universal approach, allowing any arbitrary 
device to participate in a BAN without introducing any significant overhead or running cost to the 
operation of that BAN. Unlike previous approaches, any existing motes and the base station will not have 
to be updated. Only new devices being added to the BAN will have to implement the protocol before 
connecting. Our protocol introduces overhead that reduced the performance and lifetime of the motes 
used in our BAN. 
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1. Introduction 
  
Body area networks (BANs) are formed by a group of devices, usually sensors, connected 
wirelessly in order to provide some benefit to a user. Compared to other types of networks, BANs are 
extremely short range, limited to the space occupied by one person. BANs are most often used for 
medical applications; by attaching several types of sensors to an individual, different types of vital signs 
can be gathered and then analyzed by a medical professional. As the sensors are wireless and usually 
small, the person can maintain a mobile lifestyle while still keeping track of their medical condition. 
 
Figure 1: Wireless Body Area Network [1] 
 
 Previous BAN technologies have focused on creating a BAN for a specific purpose. CodeBlue [2] 
is still in development; however it uses a purpose-built set of motes and software to provide medical 
monitoring. The CodeBlue Technical Report [3] explains that their software is expected to work with the 
Mica2, MicaZ and Telos mote platforms, along with some specialized hardware platforms. The report 
does not suggest any method for integrating other mote platforms. The report also suggests CodeBlue was 
designed only to support a particular set of medical devices. Expanding the set of supported motes does 
not seem to be a major focus of the BAN design. 
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 Although the technology, sensors, and wireless protocols have been evolving steadily over the 
last decade, there has not yet been a BAN designed for hardware flexibility. The goal of this MQP is to 
create a protocol that would allow a BAN to be “plug-and-play”; where sensors can be easily added and 
removed while minimizing the effort required by the user to reconfigure the BAN. This protocol is 
hardware agnostic, requiring only that a device be able to implement this protocol before being added to 
the BAN. This would minimize the time between the release of a new device, and when that device could 
be integrated in a BAN, while limiting the amount of work required support the changes. Additionally, 
the protocol is flexible to the hardware changes, not requiring protocol updates every time the BAN is 
modified.  
 We achieved such a protocol by changing which device is the keeper of functional information: 
as in which sensors are available, what each sensor is capable of, and what data can be sampled from each 
sensor. Some previous BANs [4] embed parts of this information in the base station, and other parts in the 
motes. Particular identifiers in messages would tell both the mote and base station which functionality 
this message applies to. We have moved all of this functional information to the mote. The mote 
inherently needs to know what sensors it has, what they are capable of, and what data it can sample from 
its sensors. However, now that this information is not assumed by the base station, there has to be a 
mechanism for the motes to communicate parts of this information to the base station. Most of the plug 
and play protocol is designed to allow motes to teach the base station. To communicate the most complex 
information, we had to define micro languages and grammars, which the base station is responsible for 
parsing. These grammars should support teaching the base station almost anything that could possibly be 
communicated. If not, the grammars can be expanded, as long as the discussing parties understand the 
changes.  
 Introducing this sort of flexibility comes at the price of performance. Based on our test results, a 
BAN operating with this protocol will have lower throughput, shorter battery life, and latency associated 
with the base station learning about the motes. Depending on the hardware being used and lifetime 
requirements, our protocol may not be viable in every situation. However, it is technically capable of 
operating in any realistic scenario. 
 Overall, we believe our body area network protocol has taken some major steps towards a 
practical, plug and play BAN. The most important of these design goals are as follows: 
 An application layer protocol that does not inherently rely on static message identifiers. 
 A protocol that can support new sensors, motes, and commands without changes to the mote 
firmware or base station application. 
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 A flexible base station learning language that can be expanded easily through changes to a few 
grammars.  
 A BAN platform that is flexible enough to support any type of research or real world application.  
 
The rest of this paper is structured as follows: Section 2 describes the basis of our BAN platform. 
Section 3 presents our BAN system model. Section 4 describes our plug and plug BAN protocol. Section 
5 details our performance testing, associated results, and highlights areas our testing did not cover. 
Section 6 provides an analysis of our plug and play protocol. Section 7 provides the conclusions of our 
work. Section 8 outlines areas of future work. Section 9 contains references. Finally, the appendices 
conclude the document. 
2. BAN Hardware Investigation 
 
Before implementing our plug and play protocol, we looked into several mote and base station 
platforms. The mote platforms needed to be flexible enough for our protocol nuances. Mote hardware 
with a wide array of open source documentation with a solid foundation was preferred. We also wanted 
the base station to be a device common to most of the public today. Smart accessories seemed to be the 
most common, practical, and flexible development platform. Following are our investigation results and 
hardware choices for this project.  
2.1 Base Station Platform 
 
 The first priority for the project was selecting what platform the base station application was 
going to run on. The three top candidates were Apple’s iOS, the Pebble watch, and Google’s Android.  
 iOS [5] offered a visually pleasing interface, but beyond that was ill suited for what the project 
required. iOS has never provided good support for working close to hardware, and Apple itself is 
generally not willing to provide assistance. However, it is worth noting that an iOS version of the base 
station software could be created. 
 The Pebble [6] watch platform would have been a nice selection, because it would be easy to 
offer information at a glance, but both the hardware and software seemed inadequate for the purpose of a 
base station.  The Pebble only offers Bluetooth connectivity, and so would require intermediate hardware 
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to communicate with devices using a different protocol. In addition, the hardware which is included in the 
Pebble is not very powerful, and may have issues with the type of processing that the project will require.  
 The platform that we decided to use was Android [7]. It runs on a multitude of devices, and 
would likely be able to run on hardware that is using multiple wireless protocols. Further, it has a robust 
developer community. 
 
2.2 Sensing Platforms 
 
 Initial research into existing and available sensing platforms for usage and integration in the BAN 
was done in preparation for the project. Development of sensors and sensing platforms is beyond the 
scope of this project and therefore it was decided to make use of an existing platform. Of the relevant 
sensing platforms available today, Emotiv [8] and Shimmer [9] were the two major platforms considered 
for the project. 
2.2.1 Emotiv 
 
The wireless neuroheadset systems developed and marketed by Emotiv [8] were one of the main 
candidates we researched to potentially utilize as the sensing platform for the project. The two core 
products offered by Emotiv are the EPOC [10] and EEG [11] wireless neuroheadsets. Both systems 
consist of an array of sensors: 14 EEG sensors, 2 addition references, as well as a gyroscope. The purpose 
of these devices is to measure electrical activity in the brain of the device wearer. In addition to the 
sensors, Emotiv provides multiple SDK options [12] and a suite of software for detecting and interpreting 
headset sensor data. Through the analysis of the Emotiv systems we determined that it was not the ideal 
sensing platform for the project. A number of concerns were raised about the Emotiv products, some of 
which included: the capabilities and sensors offered by the headsets were not varied enough for what we 
wanted in the BAN, the wireless protocol implemented by the headsets was labeled as proprietary and the 
group wanted to utilize wireless technologies commonly used in body area networks such as ZigBee [13] 
and Bluetooth [14], Emotiv did not provide substantial information about their SDK and API, and the 
pricing and licensing options for the products were deemed too expensive or too restrictive. We compared 
the Emotiv sensing platform to the Shimmer sensing platform and ultimately decided to utilize the 
Shimmer. 
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2.2.2 Shimmer Sensing Platform 
 
The Shimmer Wireless Sensing Platform has been a widely used Body Area Network platform 
for several years. The sensor motes run off of a Texas Instruments MSP430F1611 microcontroller [15]  
the MSP430 [16] line is a heavily used embedded system controller in both academic and commercial 
applications [17]. The stock firmware for these motes is TinyOS based. Daughter boards, or extension 
boards with additional sensors, can be added on to the main board for additional functionality. Additional 
sensors are separated into three groups: Kinematic sensors usually record inertial or movement 
measurements; Biophysical sensors measure personal medical data, such as heart rate; ambient sensors 
measure the world around you, such as temperature and humidity. Sensor options include: ECG, EMG, 
GSR, 9DoF, GPS, Strain Gauge, and Accelerometer.  The Shimmer platform also comes with several 
base station platforms, such as stock LabView, Matlab, Android, and Windows applications [18]. 
For the most part, the Shimmer platform fits most of our needs. The sensor data and firmware is 
highly accessible and extensible; there is no layer of obscurity added for commercial benefits. There is a 
lot of software available freely after purchasing a kit, which should give us a good foundation to start 
development. The platform is popular and well received among most researchers who have used these 
motes [19]. Their site and social media is active, with frequent updates and further development. Sample 
documentation is highly detailed, and support resources are highly available, such as their Harvard hosted 
mailing list. 
However, the platform is not perfect. Each main board only supports one daughter board each, 
meaning we will need several shimmer motes to support multiple extension sensors. Shimmer does not 
support the Bluetooth adapter they use, and any problems or questions must be answered by the third 
party manufacturer. The 802.15.4 and Bluetooth adapters cannot be used simultaneously, but can be used 
in tandem with clever firmware coding. The MSP430F1611 may be compact, but at the price of only 
having 48 KB of flash memory, and 10KB of RAM. 
Overall, Shimmer is well received as a wearable medical platform and boasts more open source 
resources than its competitors such as Sunspot and the Telos platforms [20]. Even with these major 
concerns and preliminary thoughts, this device would be a great addition to the BAN. We decided this 
was the best mote platform for this project. 
 
 
 13 
 
2.2.3 Operating System Platforms 
 
Among the selection of operating systems, which were considered for potential use on the sensor 
devices, TinyOS [21], Contiki [22], and RIOT [23] stood out. TinyOS was initially developed as a project 
at UC Berkeley [24]. The operating system is open source and is developed and supported by a large 
community around the world [25]. The Contiki OS was created by Adam Dunkels [26] and is currently an 
open source software with a large development community [27]. The RIOT operating system was first 
detailed in two papers by Baccelli et al.: “RIOT: One OS to Rule Them All in the IoT” published in 
December 2012 [28], and “RIOT OS: Towards an OS for the Internet of Things” published in April 2013 
[29]. RIOT OS launched publicly in 2013 and is an open source community project. 
TinyOS was the first OS that was considered, simply because it is the oldest and most well-
known. Being the oldest, it has been thoroughly tested, and appears solidly developed and implemented. 
TinyOS uses an event driven code style, which can help for creating clean code. An unfortunate side 
effect of this style is TinyOS’ inability to use multithreading.  
Contiki was originally developed by Adam Dunkels, who was aiming to connect low power 
devices to the Internet. Dunkels made heavy use of some of his previous projects in the development, 
leading to an operating system which functions differently from TinyOS. Nothing is event driven, instead 
favoring support for multithreaded programming. Special attention has been paid to power consumption 
as well. Contiki includes a low power implementation of IPv6 for wireless communication, and uses a 
low overhead implementation of multithreading called protothreads both of which were written by 
Dunkles. Unfortunately, low power implementations often sacrifice feature richness, and Contiki is no 
exception. 
RIOT is similar to Contiki in its reliance on multithreading. However, RIOT uses a full 
implementation, rather than just protothreads. It also supports a wide range of protocols. Unfortunately 
these features can drain the battery life, and it’s not entirely certain that we need the features that are 
offered. 
In the end, TinyOS was chosen as the platform for further development. Because TinyOS has 
been around so long, the code has been well tested, and a strong community has had the time to build up. 
With a better community comes better support and by extension an easier time solving problems that will 
arise in development. 
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3. BAN System Model 
 
 Before designing our plug and play protocol, we needed to determine exactly how a BAN should 
behave. Creating a complete system model allowed us to evaluate the specific behavior of both the motes 
and base station in a BAN. We would later use this behavior as a guide when designing our protocol; any 
behavior represented by the model must be supported by the protocol. Our model is fairly high level, and 
deals with how the motes connect and disconnect to the base station, how to view data that the motes have 
sent to the base station, and how to run commands on the motes from the base station. No additional BAN 
capabilities are assumed or inferred beyond those described in the model; any BAN that conforms to this 
model is guaranteed to be capable of implementing and using our plug and play protocol. 
3.1 BAN Workflow 
 
The BAN workflow that was developed was made to provide an overview of what will need to be 
included in our application at different levels. In doing so, the goal was to streamline implementation and 
provide a detailed outline of how the BAN architecture would operate.  
It includes a basic overview, including some specifics about what features the base station would ideally 
be capable of, but leaving out some important details which would need to be figured out when the time 
came to actually develop the framework. Additionally, everything from a user’s perspective all the way 
down to details just shy of implementation is included. The workflow also covers basic features like 
setting up a BAN, to adding and removing motes, to receiving data, to tearing down a BAN, as well as 
more complex information such as how data will be displayed to the user in different contexts. 
 Starting a BAN. 
o Gather devices which will be members of the initial BAN configuration. 
o Ensure that the base station software is installed on the device that you would like to use 
as the base station. 
o Launch the base station application. 
o An option will be presented to connect a mote to the BAN. 
 Connecting a mote to the BAN. 
o The user selects the option to add a mote to the BAN. 
o If Bluetooth is not enabled on the base station, the user will be prompted to enable it. 
o The mote that you are trying to pair must be turned on and discoverable. 
o The base station will scan for any discoverable Bluetooth devices. 
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 An option to re-scan for devices will be available. 
o The user is presented with a list of discovered devices. 
o The user selects a device from the list to begin that they want to add. 
o The base station pairs with the device. 
 Pairing is accomplished with Bluetooth SSP. 
o The device is added to a list of BAN members. 
o The user may follow the procedure outlined above to add up to 6 more devices (as limited 
by the Bluetooth piconet specification). 
 Viewing BAN sensor data. 
o The user opens a list of available sensors and selects the one(s) to be displayed. 
 Availability is determined by which devices are turned on, have Bluetooth 
enabled, and have been paired and added to the BAN 
o The application displays the requested data to the user in numerical format that is updated 
in real-time. 
o The user can select an individual data value in order to view a graphical representation of 
the data from that sensor. 
 Disconnecting a mote from the BAN. 
o The user opens a list of connected motes and selects a device to disconnect. 
 The mote that will be disconnected is not needed for this process. 
o The user confirms their wish to disconnect the device. 
o If the device is currently sending data to the base station, the base station will instruct the 
device to stop sending data. 
o The base station un-pairs from the device and the device is removed from the BAN 
member list. 
 Purging a BAN. 
o The user selects the option to purge the BAN. 
o The user is warned that all connected devices will be unpaired. 
 The devices do not need to be present for the purge to happen. 
o The user confirms their wish to purge the BAN. 
o The base station instructs all connected devices that are sending data to stop sending data 
o The base station un-pairs from all devices that are part of the BAN and the devices are 
removed from the BAN member list. 
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3.2 BAN Design, State Machines & Transition Tables 
 
 The following diagrams and tables help separate behavior into a finite number of states, each of 
which hopefully pertain to the single responsibility principle. Once these behavioral states are defined, 
how each device transitions from state to state is the only thing left ambiguous. This can then be defined 
by figuring out what transitions exist, and what is necessary for each of them to occur. 
 
Table 1: Mote Transition Table 
 
The mote has a total of six states: Idle, Discoverable, Paired, Connected, Command & Inquiry, 
and Streaming. In the idle state, the mote does nothing and no sensors are active. In the discoverable state, 
the mote will advertise its presence for pairing, as well as respond to scanning requests. The mote will 
transition back and forth between these states with an exponential backoff in order to preserve battery life. 
If the mote is reset, the exponential delay will also be reset. Once a base station pairs with the mote, the 
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mote will enter the paired state. At this point in time the mote remains undiscoverable and waits for the 
base station to either un-pair or for it to initiate a socket connection. If a connection is opened, the mote 
will enter the connected state. The mote will then automatically transition into the command & inquiry 
state. In this state, the mote waits to receive control messages from the base station. Once the mote gets 
the message, it will process it and send a response. One of the control messages will explicitly tell the 
mote to start sending sensor data. At that point the mote will enter the streaming state, and will no longer 
be configurable. If the mote needs additional configuration, it must be told to stop streaming and then the 
configuration details must be sent. This is done deliberately to maintain the single responsibility principle 
for each state. The mote will then leave these final states if the base station ever disconnects or un-pairs 
from the mote. 
 
Figure 2: Mote State Machine 
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Table 2: Base Station Transition Table 
  
The base station has a total of seven states: Idle, Discovery, Paired, Connected, Command & 
Inquiry, Mote Data, and Mote Response. The first five states act as the counterpart to the first five states 
of the mote; the only difference is that the base station is the active initiator to state transitions for the 
passive mote. The last two states convey the differing behavior between the mote and base station. In the 
mote data state, the base station can display the data being streamed from the mote. In the mote response 
state, the base station will simply wait for a response from the control message it just sent. The key 
difference here is that the transitions occur from user input on the base station, and acknowledgements 
from the mote. 
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Figure 3: Base Station State Machine 
 
4. Plug and Play Body Area Network 
 
Before a practical BAN can be made, a platform flexible enough for such extensive research must 
be created. We decided to direct our focus on an extensible BAN and application layer protocol. This 
approach implemented a BAN flexible to additions of functionality. This BAN also provided practical 
benefits, such as the base station software not requiring updates with each change to the body area 
network.  
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4.1 Plug and Play Restrictions in Previous BANS 
 
 We aim to achieve a “plug and play” Body Area Network. In this context, plug and play means 
that the BAN should be flexible to the addition of new devices, motes, and sensors. The user should not 
have to update the base station every single time a slight change is made to the BAN configuration. Our 
research indicates that previous BANs do not include this goal in their scope; since their implementation 
is used for isolated research, and not for general commercial purposes. Our Application Layer Protocol 
addresses these issues: to begin transitioning the BAN from a research lab to a more commercial 
environment.  
 Body Area Network implementations such as Shimmer’s BtStream ignore flexibility and 
extensibility as a design goal. Due to the lack of standardization with BAN protocols, and lack of focus 
for making BANs for everyday use, achieving these goals becomes quite challenging.  
Currently, if a new sensor is added to the BtStream firmware, each preexisting device would need 
to be updated with the new information. If a mote is not updated, it could drop or possibly forward 
information it does not understand. Even worse, the base station would need to be updated if the user 
wants to be able to receive data from the new sensor at all.  
The key design decision that causes these issues is the global context of information. In BtStream, 
every single device in the BAN is aware that a certain packet ID defines a particular command. Moreover, 
these packets also define what sensors currently exist in the BAN, and what can be done with them. If a 
new sensor or behavior is added, a new packet ID will have to be created, and dispersed to the devices in 
the BAN. This means each device will most likely have to be re-flashed or updated. These changes could 
be as simple as editing a configuration file, or as complex as rewriting a large portion of the firmware. 
However, this information is usually only pertinent to a single mote and its base station. If the mote was 
the keeper of its specific knowledge, and the base station was able to learn from the mote, the global 
context can be eliminated.  
 
4.2 Application Layer Protocol for a Plug and Play BAN 
 
Our application layer protocol attempts to resolve the issues just described, by removing the 
global context of information within the BAN. By making the motes the keepers of their own information 
they will as a result need a framework to communicate this information to the base station. The base 
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station will in turn need a generic way of understanding and parsing the information it learns from each 
connected mote. 
4.2.1 Packet Structures 
 
The following packet structures provide a foundation for motes to teach the base station about 
their sensors and commands, and to facilitate communication thereafter. 
 
Figure 4: Application Layer Header 
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 The application layer header, shown in Figure 4 above, consists of basic packet information, such 
as total packet size and packet sequence number, as well as a message ID. The message ID provides a 
means to identify and differentiate between packet types within the protocol. Compared to the BtStream 
protocol, there is a significantly smaller number of hard coded messages required. The seven currently 
defined messages types act as the framework for any mote to speak to the base station and teach it how to 
interact with a mote. The available sensors and behavior are not defined in global identifiers, but within 
the responses from a particular mote. If a new mote can implement and send the proper responses to these 
requests, then it should be able to join and operate in the BAN.  
 
Figure 5: Sensor Inquiry Packet Structure 
 
The first of the framework packets, the Sensor Inquiry show above in Figure 5, allows a base 
station to interview a mote to discover its available sensors. The mote must respond with a sensor 
mapping for each sensor it has available. This mapping consists of a sensor ID and the sensor’s name. 
Note that this sensor ID is only applicable to this mote, and is not global to the BAN. The base station can 
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differentiate this sensor ID from other motes’ sensor IDs by recording a unique group of sensor mappings 
for each mote. However, within the local context of a particular mote, sensor ID 0 is reserved to specify 
the general mote device and not a specific sensor on the mote. This restriction was made to provide a 
means with which to handle global actions on a mote, for example setting the overall sampling rate of the 
mote. The sampling rate cannot be set on a per-sensor basis and is therefore set by using the general mote 
sensor ID.  
 
Figure 6: Data Inquiry Packet Structure 
 
The Data Inquiry request packet provides the base station with a way to query a mote for 
information pertaining to the data of the mote’s sensors. The response packet enables the mote to specify 
what type of data a sensor will produce and send to the base station. The structure of these packets can be 
seen above in Figure 6. Each value mapping consists of the size, type, name and units of the data sent. 
Additionally, a raw data conversion expression is included. Most motes are embedded systems, with 
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limited computational resources. Most BANs, including this one, prefer to send raw data to the base 
station for processing; the base station is usually a more powerful device that can handle luxury 
computations. In other BANs, such as BtStream, this conversion would be hard coded for a particular 
global data identifier. This conversion equation is needed in order to transform raw data into something 
meaningful for the BAN user. 
For this equation, we have defined a preliminary grammar. The Raw Data Conversion Equation is 
an ASCII string representing a mathematical expression. Any instances of ‘x’ in the expression will be 
replaced by the raw data value. The other symbols should consist of operators and numerical constants. 
Basic arithmetic operators will be initially supported, but the supported operators could be expanded if 
necessary. The PEMDAS order of operations will also be assumed initially. As long as the motes and 
base station are in agreement, this grammar can be changed or expanded.  
 
Figure 7: Command Inquiry Packet Structure 
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The base station learns about the commands available for the mote and each sensor through use of 
the Command Inquiry request packet, depicted above in Figure 7. The response by the mote provides the 
base station with the name of each command and an identifier for the command. Just as a sensor ID is 
associated with a particular mote, a command ID is associated with a particular sensor on a mote. As 
such, different sensors may have the same Command ID(s), but this is not a guarantee that those 
commands are functionally equivalent. A command ID is locally significant to a sensor on a mote. Due to 
the complexity of commands, getting the input and output are split up into separate packets.  
 
 
Figure 8: Command Parameters Inquiry Packet Structure 
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The Command Parameters Inquiry packet, shown in Figure 8 above, enables the base station to 
ask a mote for information regarding a particular command. The response by the mote specifies what 
parameters need to be sent with a particular command. This information is contained with parameter 
mappings. Included with each mapping is the parameter name, size, type, and units. In addition, a 
parameter restriction set is specified. Similarly to the raw data conversion equation, a grammar has been 
defined to restrict the subset of valid values a parameter can have. 
Any values included must be numerical constants matching the parameter type specified. These 
constants can be defined as a range: ‘i - j’ conveys ‘i to j inclusively’. They can also be defined as a set: 
‘i, j, k’ conveys ‘only exactly i, j, or k are valid’. Combining the range and set grammar was not 
permitted. In implementation, when values are defined as a set, these restriction set values are treated as 
enumerations by both the base station and mote firmware. For example, a sensor sensitivity restriction set 
of “5, 10, 15, 25” would be treated as an enumeration and mapped accordingly to values 0, 1, 2, 3. 
Therefore, when the base station wishes to change the sensor sensitivity to 10 it would send the value 1 as 
the command parameter in the command packet.  Just like the previous grammar, if additional 
specifications are required, the language can be expanded as long as the mote and base station are in 
agreement.  
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Figure 9: Command Returns Inquiry Packet Structure 
 
The Command Returns Inquiry packet, displayed in Figure 9 above, specifies the return values 
the mote will respond with when a command is sent from the base station. The definition of this packet is 
similar to that of the data inquiry packet, as its mapping is exactly the same as the data inquiry packet. 
Since both packets are data responses from the mote, their mappings require the same information. 
However, we thought it would be best to separate streaming data and command returns from the mote.  
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Figure 10: Base Station Learned Command Packet Structure 
 
The Base Station Learned Command packet, shown in Figure 10, provides the base station with a 
means to execute a command it has learned from a mote. If a command executed has any associated 
return values those values will be included in the response from the mote. Otherwise, the bare response 
with just the sensor ID and command ID acts as an acknowledgement of the request. 
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Figure 11: Mote Data Packet Structure 
 
The Mote Data request packet is utilized to ask a mote within the BAN for sensor data. This 
packet, show in Figure 11 above, is sent to request data once the base station has connected to a mote and 
learned how to interact with it by following the previously described protocol. The request packet doubles 
as both a means to ask a mote to send and to stop sending sensor data. If the mote is not currently sending 
data, then the request will initiate streaming of data. If the mote is currently sending data, the request will 
halt further sending. The Mote Data response packet contains the sensor data for any sensors active and 
sampling on the mote at the time of the request. This data takes the form of the sensor ID followed by the 
sample data for that sensor. The sensor ID provides a means to differentiate between data from different 
sensors on the same mote and it used by the base station to separate and process data according to sensor 
type. 
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Figure 12: Protocol Data Types 
 
Many of the protocol packets described include a type ID. Due to the fact that bytes sent back and 
forth over the network can be interpreted in several different ways, type IDs were needed to standardize 
their interpretation per packet. Figure 12 above defines a preliminary set of ways to interpret a byte 
sequence. More can be defined as needed. However, for general use, the byte array type should be 
flexible enough for most interpretations not defined above.  
 The protocol outlined accomplishes our aforementioned design goals. This application layer 
protocol does not inherently rely on static message identifiers for the motes and base station to 
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communicate meaningfully. The only specified message identifiers define the learning process for the 
base station application. Since this protocol supports virtually every data type, input restriction, and 
output conversion, the identifiers are unlikely to change. It is possible that the restriction set and 
conversion equation grammars would need to be expanded. This achieves our next design goal: a base 
station learning language that can be expanded easily through changes to a few grammars. Most of the 
unprecedented learning situations will occur when commands and sensor data are described. Each of 
these is dependent on a respective grammar. Since these grammars are merely a predetermined language, 
they can be expanded as long as both parties are in agreement. These grammars are already fairly general, 
and will probably not have to be updated for most applications.  
The most common change to the BAN will be the addition of new sensors, motes, or commands. 
The current protocol version supports these without changes to the current motes’ firmware or base 
station application: achieving yet another goal. As long as a new mote can talk to the base station in the 
predetermined language, it can teach the application everything it needs to know. New sensors and 
commands need only be appended to the existing inquiry responses. Finally, this protocol is flexible for 
any type research or real world application because it supports virtually any nuances. The grammars and 
inquiry structure we defined allow for an unlimited set of capabilities to be incorporated into any BAN 
that implements our protocol. 
 
4.3 Firmware Implementation 
 
Firmware for the sensor motes was implemented in a variant of the C programming language 
called nesC [30], the language that the TinyOS operating system is written in. We chose to utilize TinyOS 
and leverage nesC for our firmware implementation as those technologies were utilized by Shimmer 
Research for their applications.  In addition, the Python programming language was utilized to make 
testing scripts to simulate interaction with a base station device. 
Implementation was carried out on modified versions of the virtual machine development 
environment provided by Shimmer Research with the Shimmer platform development kit. These virtual 
machines came pre-loaded with the TinyOS source code and many of the required libraries necessary for 
TinyOS development and helped streamline the development set-up process. We utilized the Eclipse IDE 
[31] and YETI 2 Eclipse Plug-In [32] during development. The YETI 2 plug-in provides an extension to 
the Eclipse IDE and enables nesC editor support and built-in tools for TinyOS development.  A Git 
repository hosted on WPI’s FusionForge [33] provided version control for the development. 
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4.3.1 Mote Firmware Architecture 
 
 
Figure 13: Firmware Component Diagram 
 
The main firmware component, shown above in Figure 13, is split up into two major components. 
The Communicator deals with sending and receiving data while the Mote handles processing data. The 
firmware module itself is quite lightweight, as it only deals with delegating tasks or managing interactions 
between the Communicator and Mote components. The SD card logging module is initialized within the 
firmware at boot time and then can be utilized elsewhere by other components and modules.  
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Figure 14: Communicator Component Diagram 
 
The Communicator component, shown in Figure 14, handles the sending and receiving of data on 
a mote. Currently, motes in the BAN utilize the Bluetooth protocol and as a result the Communicator 
implements Bluetooth related functionality such as connection events (e.g. when a connection is received 
and when a connection is closed). Bluetooth could be replaced with another communication protocol if 
desired and with limited changes needed. When the Communicator receives data it stores the data in a 
double-buffer data structure called the ReceiveBuffer. Once an entire packet is received and stored by the 
ReceiveBuffer, the Communicator then hands the packet off to the Mote component for parsing. All 
packets leaving a mote are passed to the Communicator component for transmission.  
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Figure 15: Mote Component Diagram 
 
The Mote component, shown in Figure 15, handles incoming request processing, delegating 
requests to sensors, forwarding responses back to the Firmware component for transmission, as well as 
handling sensor data sampling. These three main behaviors are split into the parser, sensor array, and 
sampler components respectively. In addition, the Mote component handles requests made not to a 
specific sensor but to a mote in general, e.g. setting the sampling rate of the mote which is global to the 
entire mote. 
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Figure 16: SD Card Logging Component Diagram 
 
 The SDLogging component, shown in Figure 16, provides basic logging capabilities to the 
firmware. Currently, the firmware creates a “/logs” directory in the root directory of the SD card on the 
mote. Four log files are created within the logs directory at firmware boot time: an information log, a 
warning log, an error log, and a battery log. This module can be expanded or modified easily to facilitate 
firmware logging needs. 
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Figure 17: Parser Component Graph 
 
 
Figure 18: Sensor Array Component Diagram 
 
The Parser and ShimmerArray components, shown in Figure 17 and Figure 18 respectively, both 
work underneath the mote component. Received packets are sent to the Parser component and initial 
parsing is done to figure out what type of packet was received. Based on the type of packet parsed, 
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actions are delegated to other components by first informing the Mote component that a specific packet 
type has been parsed. Any information in the packet that is required by a component down the line is 
handed back to the Mote from the Parser. The Mote component then calls the appropriate commands, 
defined in the sensor array component, in order to process the request parsed by the parser. The sensor 
array abstracts functionality common to all sensors on a mote. Requests handled by the sensor array are 
returned to the Mote component once completed. For example, if a sensor inquiry request is sent to a 
mote the sensor array will construct the response packet and then hand it off to the Mote component for 
handling. 
 
 
Figure 19: Shimmer Mote Component Diagram 
 
 The ShimmerMote component, shown in Figure 19 above, is utilized to handle any global 
requests made to the mote that do not pertain to a specific sensor. Global requests such as setting the 
sampling rate or buffer sizes of the mote are examples of requests this component handles. 
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Figure 20: Sampler Component Diagram 
 
The Sampler component, shown in Figure 20 above, handles aspects related to sensor data 
sampling and sample aggregation. When a non-zero sampling rate is set and when instructed to start, the 
module will tell the ADC component to begin sample at the proper rate. Any sensors that have been 
initialized for ADC sampling will be included in the ADC samples. Once the ADC finishes taking a raw 
sample, the Sampler will ask the mote to process the sample. The processed samples will then be stored in 
by a buffer in the DataBuffer component. When this buffer is filled with the configured number of 
samples, it will signal the Sampler that buffer is full. The Sampler will then delegate to the Mote to 
handle the samples that are ready to be sent out. 
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Figure 21: Shimmer ADC Component Diagram 
 
 The ShimmerADC component, show above in Figure 21, provides functionality to interact with 
the MSP430’s ADC hardware in order to facilitate data sampling from sensors on the motes. Currently, as 
our firmware only supports Shimmer sensors and hardware, the ADC exclusively utilizes the 
shimmerAnalogSetup component. That component enables Shimmer sensors to be added to the ADC 
inputs in preparation for sampling and is used by all Shimmer sensor modules. 
 
 
Figure 22: Data Buffer Component Diagram 
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 The DataBuffer component, shown in Figure 22 above, is comprised of a double-buffer structure 
and is utilized to store sensor samples received by the ADC. The Sampler component utilizes this 
component to store the ADC samples. Once the data buffer is full, the buffer is handed off and any data 
post processing required by specific sensors is carried out by individual sensor modules. 
 
 
Figure 23: Shimmer Example Sensor Module Component Diagram 
 
 The ShimmerAccel component, see Figure 23 above, is an example of one of the sensor modules 
created to provide functionality specific to a sensor on a mote. Each sensor module provides the same 
interface and general functionality. A sensor module handles constructing protocol responses to requests 
made to the mote, as well as carries out sensor data post processing if necessary.  
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4.4 Base Station Implementation 
 
The base station application was created in the Android SDK [34], a freely available modification 
of the Eclipse IDE [31]. Source control was provided by a Git repository hosted by WPI’s FusionForge 
[33].  
 
4.4.1 Application Architecture 
 
The base station app consists of five major components. 
 
Figure 24: UML Diagram of the Application Frontend Component 
 
The Application Frontend is responsible for the Graphical User Interface (GUI) of the app and 
can be seen in Figure 24 above. This is the first of two components that will be heavily dependent on 
implementation platform. There are three main Activities, or Views, in the application. These are the 
MainActivity, which displays connected sensors and any data being received from them, the 
SettingsActivity, which shows a list of possible sensors to pair with, and the LogActivity, which is used 
to display internal application logging. Finally, the CommandDialogFragment is used to show a pop-up 
list of commands for a sensor selected in the MainActivity. Each MoteThread is associated with one 
sensing platform, and is responsible for communicating with that platform. When needed, the 
MoteThread can pass messages to the MainActivity to trigger updates to the GUI, such as when new data 
is received or a new sensor is connected. These messages are assigned a MESSAGE_TYPE. Finally, the 
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BTDevice was created as a wrapper class for the built in android BluetoothDevice to provide specialized 
functionality in some methods. 
 
 
Figure 25: UML Diagram of the Mote Component 
 
 Each sensing platform, or mote, is represented by a BasicShimmerMote (shown in Figure 25), 
which implements the more general IShimmer. This interface could probably be implemented for motes 
created by other companies as well, however each implementation will probably be platform specific. 
Each BasicShimmerMote is constructed by passing the Android BluetoothSocket object that represents 
the connection to the mote. Each mote contains all the logic needed to send, receive, and process packets. 
A new static SequenceNumber is instantiated by each BasicShimmerMote to make sure that the sequence 
number applied to outgoing packets is incremented properly. The SequenceNumber.next() method is 
thread-safe. Finally, the TYPE_ID and MESSAGE_ID classes provide definitions for constants defined in 
the communication protocol. 
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Figure 26: UML Diagram of the Command Component 
 
 The Command Component, shown in Figure 26 above, is responsible for creating and processing 
any arbitrary command that the base station learns from the communication protocol. The 
CommandFactory provides static methods for generating the commands that are already built into the 
protocol. LearnedCommand, an implementation of ILearnedCommand, represents a single learned 
command. Each learned command may have any number of associated ReturnMapping and 
ParamMapping, which allow the base station to process return values and assign parameter values 
respectively. 
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Figure 27: UML Diagram of the Sensor Component 
 
 The Sensor Component deals with each individual sensor, as opposed to the entire mote and is 
depicted in Figure 27 above. A SensorMap is a wrapper for the Java HashMap structure, however any 
underlying Map structure that provides a key set could be used. The ISensor interface provides the needed 
commands for each individual sensor, and is implemented by the Sensor class. Finally, the SensorFactory 
was made to separate the logic for generating Sensor objects from protocol data.  This logic could also be 
handled in the IShimmer processPacket method. 
 
 
Figure 28: UML Diagram of the Data Component 
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 The Data component, shown in Figure 28 above, is fairly simple. It consists of a ValueMapping, 
which contains the necessary information to parse and format mote data, and a CalculatorFactory, which 
creates the required Calculable objects to convert mote data into a more readable form. Please see Section 
4.4.1.2 for more information about Calculable objects 
 
 
Figure 29: UML Diagram of Component Interconnection 
 
 Figure 29 (above) provides a high level view for how each component is connected. 
 
4.4.2 Technologies Utilized 
 
As a part of the base station implementation, we utilized some third party libraries to expedite 
development. The following are descriptions of the libraries used, and how they were integrated into the 
application.  
 
4.4.1.1 Expj4 
 
As part of the protocol, the base station is required to convert mote data. The Conversion 
Expression provided as part of the Data Inquiry had to be parsed into a mathematical expression capable 
of being evaluated multiple times for different variable values. The exp4j [35] library is a small 
implementation of Dijkstra’s Shunting Yard Algorithm, which in this case is used to create Calculable 
objects based on Strings of mathematical expressions. By defining a character to represent the raw data 
value, it is possible to use this library to easily and quickly create a Calculable object for any valid 
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mathematical expression. This object can then be reused each time a new data value is received from a 
mote and transform that value into an appropriate unit and scale. This implementation uses the character 
‘x’ to denote the location where the raw mote data should be substituted in the expression. 
 
4.4.3 User Interface Design 
 
 In order to convey the plug and play abilities of our protocol, we needed a user interface to 
clearly display the functioning of our design goals. While user experience was not a priority, we still 
required an interface to make our protocol usable. The following details the choices user interface 
decisions we made.  
 
4.4.3.1 Graphing 
 
Although displaying information in real time can be helpful, displaying data in a pleasing and 
helpful manner can help a user better understand what it means without the need for more in-depth 
analysis. This is why graphing was included in the base station software. We determined a set of features 
that our method of plotting would need to offer: it would need to be real time, be well used, and have a 
license that would allow it to be included in the base station software. 
The most obvious option was to simply roll our own implementation of graphing. However, upon 
seeing the selection of available libraries it became clear that there were already options that perfectly fit 
the application requirements.  
One of the first libraries investigated was AChartEngine [36]. ACE has a large number of plotting 
methods, which is nice from a usability point of view. It claims to be well optimized for dealing with a 
large number of values at a time. It also has a decent following on google code and Facebook. However, 
Real time plotting doesn’t seem to be offered, and the project has not been updated in seven months at the 
time of writing. 
ChartDroid [37] offers most of the features that the base station requires. However, by design it is 
impossible to include it within our base station. Rather than importable libraries, ChartDroid requires the 
user to install external libraries and edit configuration files, with very little benefit in return. 
GraphView [38]  is a simple and efficient implementation of basic graphing features. It was not 
used in the base station because it can only display bar charts. More importantly it requires all values 
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beforehand, making it thoroughly useless for real time plotting. Java Charts for Android (Java[TM] 
Charts for Android) was included in the list of libraries to consider, but was quickly ruled out because the 
license does not permit free educational use. 
AndroidPlot [39] was determined to be the best library to use for this project. It uses the Apache 
2.0 license, so it can be included in the base station. It offers a decent selection of unique graph types, so 
there is a good chance that it will be able to handle whatever data is generated by the BAN. It is in active 
development, and is used in hundreds of applications, so it has been well tested.  
We decided to use the best option available, and integrated AndroidPlot. The combination of 
useful features, active development, robust community and compatible license made it a perfect fit. The 
graphs were added as a scroll view, so that users can quickly view the incoming data from every sensor. 
With this implementation, users are provided the easy to interpret overview that graphs provide. 
 
4.4.4 BAN Base Station Application 
 
 Below are several screenshots demonstrating the operation of our base station application. Note 
that on the home screen, each sensor will be grouped by background color. Each mote may have multiple 
sensors, as seen in Figure 33. 
.  
Figure 30: Base Station Application Home Screen 
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Figure 31: Base Station Application Option Menu 
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Figure 32: Base Station Application Add Mote to BAN 
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Figure 33: Base Station Application With One Mote Added 
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Figure 34: Base Station Application With Three Motes Added 
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Figure 35: Base Station Application Recieving Data 
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Figure 36: Base Station Application Graphing Resting 3-Axis Accelerometer 
 
Figure 37: Base Station Application Graphing Dropped 3-Axis Accelerometer 
 
 54 
 
5. Plug and Play BAN Performance Analysis 
  
 With such a radical new protocol design, we expected there to be performance costs involved. In 
order to gauge these costs, we performed a set of testing scenarios. For each scenario, results were 
gathered. Some of these results could be directly compared with our mote platform’s published results. 
Other metrics helped map out the limits and restrictions of our plug and play BAN. Any metrics we were 
unable or did not test are also included, in the event they may affect future research.  
5.1 Testing Scenarios 
 
The majority of these tests were aimed to directly compare the costs of our Plug-and-Play design 
to the same platform without these design changes. Comparing to other BAN platforms would not be 
useful as the hardware changes alone would mean results could not be directly compared. The other tests 
were focused on displaying the costs of a Plug-and-Play design, as well as the limits of our BAN. 
 
5.1.1 Shimmer Results 
 
These were the results Shimmer published on their BtStream Firmware, a lightweight mote 
system that allows for data collection from almost all available sensors. 
 
5.1.1.1 BAN Lifetime 
 
Shimmer did not have any base station results. For comparison purposes, we assumed the base 
station battery life was not the minimum of the BAN. Since the BAN lifetime was defined as the 
minimum lifetime of a node, Shimmer mote lifetimes were enough to calculate this metric. The following 
table displays data gather by Shimmer documenting the battery life duration of sensor motes under 
varying configurations [40]. 
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Sensors Enabled Sampling Rate (Hz) Battery Life Duration (hh:mm) 
Accel 51.2 15:00 
Accel 102.4 13:00 
Accel & Gyro 51.2 12:00 
Accel & Gyro 102.4 11:00 
Accel, Gyro & Mag 51.2 10:30 
Accel, Gyro & Mag 102.4 10:30 
Accel & EMG 512 13:36 
Accel & EMG 1024 12:05 
EMG 512 13:50 
EMG 1024 13:38 
Accel & GSR 51.2 15:12 
GSR 10.2 17:55 
Table 3: Shimmer BtStream Firmware Lifetime 
 
5.1.1.2 Shimmer BAN Throughput 
 
Shimmer did not have any base station results. For comparison purposes, we assumed the base 
station was able to process at the given sampling rates without issue. The following table displays 
throughput and data rate limitations data provided by Shimmer for their BtStream firmware [4]. 
Packet Size 
(bytes) 
Sensors Active (and byte costs) Max Sampling 
Frequency (Hz) 
Throughput Goodput 
9 Data Packet (x1) + Accelerometer (x6) + 
Timestamp (x2) 
1024 
 
 
9.216 KB/s 6.144 KB/s 
11 Data Packet (x1) + Accelerometer (x6) + 
EMG (x2) + Timestamp (x2) 
512 5.632 KB/s 4.096 KB/s 
13 Data Packet (x1) + Accelerometer (x6) + 
ECG (x4) + Times 
512 6.656 KB/s 5.12 KB/s 
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tamp (x2)  
15 Data Packet (x1) + Accelerometer (x6) + 
Gyroscope (x6) + Timestamp (x2) 
512 7.680 KB/s 6.144 KB/s 
16 Data Packet (x1) + Accelerometer (x6) + 
Gyroscope (x6) + Heart Rate (x1) 
+ Timestamp (x2) 
512 8.192 KB/s 6.656 KB/s 
 
17 Data Packet (x1) + Accelerometer (x6) + 
Gyroscope (x6) + Expansion (x2) 
+ Timestamp (x2) 
 
512 8.704 KB/s 7.168 KB/s 
 
18 Data Packet (x1) + Accelerometer (x6) + 
Gyroscope (x6) + Expansion (x2) 
+ Heart Rate (x1) + Timestamp (x2) 
 
512 9.216 KB/s 7.68 KB/s 
 
19 Data Packet (x1) + Accelerometer (x6) + 
Gyroscope (x6) + Expansion (x2) 
+ Expansion (x2) + Timestamp (x2) 
 
512 9.728 KB/s 8.192 KB/s 
 
20 Data Packet (x1) + Accelerometer (x6) + 
Gyroscope (x6) + Expansion (x2) 
+ Expansion (x2) + Heart Rate (x1) + 
Timestamp (x2) 
512 10.24 KB/s 8.704 KB/s 
 
21 Data Packet (x1) + Accelerometer (x6) + 
Gyroscope (x6) + Magnetometer (x6) + 
Timestamp (x2) 
 
256 5.376 KB/s 4.608 KB/s 
 
Table 4: Shimmer BtStream Firmware Throughput 
 
5.1.2 Mote Lifetime Test 
 
 The purpose of the mote lifetime test was to measure the battery life of the BAN motes; 
specifically when a mote is active, sampling, and streaming data to the base station. We tested how 
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different sensor configurations affect the battery life of motes within the BAN. To do so, we ran motes in 
varying states. 
This test was run with the following sensor configurations: 
● Accelerometer 
● Accelerometer and Gyroscope 
● Accelerometer, Gyroscope, and Magnetometer 
● Accelerometer and GSR 
● GSR 
Method 
1. Charge mote on power station until battery is full 
2. Charge the base station until battery is full 
3. Flash motes with project firmware for applicable onboard sensors 
4. Setup BAN operation with each device no more than a meter apart 
5. Start the base station BAN application 
6. Have the base station pair with the mote 
7. Execute all protocol inquiries 
8. Turn on the applicable onboard sensors 
9. Set the sampling rate to the current value Shimmer used in their results for the current 
configuration.  
10. Set the buffer size to 1; this should be the default (un-buffered sending) 
11. Record the initial timestamp on the base station 
12. Record and update the timestamp on the base station when data was last received 
13. Collect data from the mote until it stops sending data 
Metric Comparisons 
The following metric comparisons were made directly from the test. Our expected outcome is included.  
Sensor Configuration vs. Mote Battery Life 
The battery life can be calculated by comparing the initial timestamp, and the timestamp of the last 
received data packet. The mote stopped sending data because the battery life was expended. The elapsed 
time since the base station requested data to the last data received is synonymous with the mote lifetime. 
Because this Plug and Play firmware had larger headers, we expect the battery life to be reduced, since 
the mote must send out larger packets per sample. 
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5.1.3 Control Message Latency Test 
 
 The control message latency test was designed to measure the amount of time required by a mote 
within the BAN to process and respond to protocol request packets. In particular, our testing was focused 
on the control messages used to initially teach the base station how to interact with a mote. Specifically: 
Sensor Inquiry, Command Inquiry, Command Parameters Inquiry, Command Returns Inquiry, and Data 
Inquiry messages. In doing so, we tested how different sensor configurations affect the time it takes the 
mote to construct an inquiry response and send it to the base station. 
This test was run with the following sensor configurations: 
● Accelerometer 
● Accelerometer and Gyroscope 
● Accelerometer, Gyroscope, and Magnetometer 
● Accelerometer and GSR 
● GSR 
● Accelerometer and ECG 
● ECG 
● Accelerometer and EMG 
● EMG 
Method 
1. Flash motes with project firmware for applicable onboard sensors 
2. Setup BAN operation with each device no more than a meter apart 
3. Start the base station BAN application 
4. Have the base station pair with the mote 
5. Execute each protocol inquiry one at a time 
6. Have the base station record a timestamp for when the request was sent 
7. Once the response is received, record another timestamp 
Metric Comparisons 
The following metric comparisons were made directly from the test. Our expected outcome is included.  
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Sensor Configuration vs. BAN Inquiry & Control Message Latency 
To conduct this test, the base station sent out every possible plug and play protocol message to learn how 
to interact with the mote for data. This communication occurred at the beginning of each connection. For 
each of these packets, the time it took to receive a response was recorded. This information was graphed 
to see the relation of the sensors active on the firmware to how long it takes to process and respond to a 
Base Station request. We expected the variance in latency to be minimal, but would be greater than the 
latency of a static packet being sent. This test was repeated 1000 times for each inquiry type and sensor 
configuration. 
 
5.1.4 Base Station Battery Life Test 
 
Description 
 The base station battery life test was carried out to determine how long the base station would last 
under different operating circumstances. In doing so, we tested and observed how processing data affects 
the battery life of the base station platform. 
This test was run with the following configuration: 
● Base station running but processing no data 
● Base station running and processing enough data to consume 100% of the CPU capacity 
The results were graphed side-by-side as a bar graph. 
Method 
1. The base station platform will be fully charged 
2. The base station platform will be disconnected from external power, and the base station 
application will be launched with the configuration described in one of the independent variable 
states 
3. The base station application will log to a file the time that the application was launched 
4. The base station application will log the current time and battery percentage every time a data 
packet is received from the mote or every 60 seconds, whichever is sooner. 
5. Once the battery on the base station platform fails, the difference between the start time and the 
last logged periodic time will be the total time the battery lasted ± 60 seconds 
a. If the base station lasts longer than the motes used for testing, total battery 
lifetime will have to be extrapolated 
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6. The base station platform will be fully recharged before re-running the test for each additional 
independent variable state 
 
5.1.5 BAN Throughput Test 
 
Description 
The BAN throughput test was utilized to determine the maximum sampling rate of motes in the 
BAN. In doing so, we then utilized the max sampling rate for a mote to calculate other statistics such as: 
transmission rate (Hz), throughput (KB/s), and goodput (KB/s). In particular, we were interested in seeing 
how our plug and play protocol overhead affects the max sampling rate and as a direct result the effective 
throughput and goodput of the motes. 
This test was run with the following sensor configurations: 
● Accelerometer 
● Accelerometer and EMG 
● Accelerometer and ECG 
● Accelerometer and Gyroscope 
● Accelerometer, Gyroscope, and Magnetometer 
 
To determine the max sampling rate the test started at the one half the lowest sampling rate Shimmer 
recorded. Then, a binary search algorithm, similar how the size of an unbounded array is calculated, was 
utilized to narrow down the maximum sampling rate. If the range between the previous working rate and 
next rate to test became smaller than 32 Hz the test was halted. The results were graphed separately for 
each sensor configuration. Each sensor configuration had a different but constant packet size that we used 
to calculate throughput once the maximum sampling rate was determined. 
Method 
1. Charge mote on power station until battery is full 
2. Charge the base station until battery is full 
3. Flash motes with project firmware for applicable onboard sensors 
4. Setup BAN operation with each device no more than a meter apart 
5. Start the base station BAN application 
6. Have the base station pair with the mote 
7. Execute all protocol inquiries 
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8. Turn on the applicable onboard sensors 
9. Set the sampling rate to the ½ the lowest sampling rate Shimmer recorded 
10. Set the buffer size to 1 (un-buffered sending) 
11. Attempt to receive streamed data on the base station 
12. Verify whether sampling rate currently testing works 
13. Continue to narrow down maximum sampling rate until found 
Metric Comparisons 
The following metric comparisons were made directly from the test. Our expected outcome is included.  
Sampling Rate vs. Mote Throughput 
Once the maximum sampling rate has been pinpointed, the throughput can be calculated by multiplying 
the sample rate with the size of each sample. Since the plug and play firmware has larger headers for each 
sample, we expect the maximum sampling rate to be less than Shimmer’s sampling rate. However, the 
throughput should be about the same, because the packet sizes will have increased. Although, the goodput 
of plug and play BAN will most likely be less than that of Shimmer’s BAN, because the increased packet 
sizes are not from samples, but from protocol headers. 
Other Metrics 
The following metrics were collected indirectly from the test.  
Maximum Sampling Rate 
A by-product of this test was calculating the limiting sampling rate for each sensor configuration. Any 
further tests should not exceed these maximum sampling rates. If they do, the tests should expect probable 
failure of the BAN. 
 
5.2 Test Results 
 
 The following section details the results of our testing scenarios and is organized by results for 
each testing scenario described in the previous section. 
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5.2.1 Mote Lifetime Test Results 
  
The comparison of mote lifetime between our firmware and BtStream revealed that our protocol 
and firmware has a negative impact on battery life. This is due to the additional overhead required when 
implementing our protocol. Data packets require the addition of a header, which was not included in 
BtStream. For details about the test scenario, see 5.1.2 Mote Lifetime Test 
 
 
Figure 38: Mote Lifetime Graph 
 
5.2.2 Control Message Latency Test Results 
 
 Below are the results from the test scenario described in section 5.1.3 Control Message Latency 
Test. These results summarize the latency associated with motes processing different types of control 
messages.  
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5.2.2.1 Sensor Inquiry Latency Test Results 
 
Figure 39: Sensor Inquiry Latency Graph 
 
 The average latency required to process and respond to a sensor inquiry varied depending on the 
mote configuration. In general, a higher number of sensors caused a higher latency. For details about the 
test scenario, see 5.1.3 Control Message Latency Test. 
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5.2.2.2 Command Inquiry Latency Test Results 
 
Figure 40: Command Inquiry Latency Graph 
 
 The time required to process command inquiries was fairly uniform regardless of mote 
configuration. Each configuration except for the gyroscope, EMG, and ECG had at least one command. 
Those three sensors had no commands implemented, so their responses were much shorter. For details 
about the test scenario, see 5.1.3 Control Message Latency Test. 
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5.2.2.3 Command Parameters Inquiry Latency Test Results 
 
Figure 41: Command Parameters Inquiry Latency Graph 
 
 The latency for command parameters inquiry was fairly consistent. The gyroscope, ECG, and 
EMG had no commands implemented, and therefore had no command parameters. For details about the 
test scenario, see 5.1.3 Control Message Latency Test. 
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5.2.2.4 Command Returns Inquiry Latency Test Results 
 
Figure 42: Command Returns Inquiry Latency Graph 
 
 The latency for the command returns inquiry was consistent across all test scenarios. The 
gyroscope, ECG and EMG had no custom commands implemented, and as such, they had no command 
returns to send. For details about the test scenario, see 5.1.3 Control Message Latency Test. 
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5.2.2.5 Data Inquiry Latency Test Results 
 
Figure 43: Data Inquiry Latency Graph 
 
 The latency between data inquiry requests and responses was highly consistent across all 
configurations. Each configuration sent at least one reply to the inquiry. Configurations with multiple 
sensors did not require additional time as each data inquiry packet queried for information about one 
sensor. For details about the test scenario, see 5.1.3 Control Message Latency Test. 
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5.2.3 Base Station Lifetime Test 
 
Figure 44: Base Station Lifetime Graph 
 
 This test was designed to evaluate the best and worst case lifetime of our base station. At idle, or 
0% CPU load, we project the base station would last 13,802 minutes or about 9.5 days. However, at 
maximum capacity or 100% CPU load, the battery lasted only 224 minutes. These results are visualized 
above in Figure 44. 
 
5.2.4 BAN Throughput Test Results 
Sensor Configuration Accel 
Accel & 
EMG 
Accel & 
ECG 
Accel & 
Gyro 
Accel & Gyro & 
Mag 
Total Packet Size (bytes) 124 125 125 117 110 
Header Size (bytes) 5 5 5 5 5 
Total Sample Size (bytes) 7 10 12 14 21 
Sample Overhead (bytes) 1 2 2 2 3 
Buffer Size (number of 
samples) 17 12 10 8 5 
Max Sampling Frequency (Hz) 512 320 256 256 128 
Transmission Rate (Hz) 30.118 26.667 25.6 32.0 25.6 
Throughput (KB/s) 3.735 3.333 3.200 3.744 2.816 
Goodput (KB/s) 3.072 2.560 2.560 3.072 2.304 
Table 5: Throughput Test Results 
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 As expected, our protocol introduced overhead, which lowers the effective maximum sampling 
rate. As a direct result, the net throughput and goodput are lower than other protocols, such as BtStream. 
Our throughput was approximately one half of that achieved by Shimmer with BtStream [4] in all testing 
scenarios. The goodput we achieved was a little worse than half of the goodput in BtStream due to the 
additional overhead. Our investigation revealed that buffering samples on the motes before transmission 
significantly increased overall throughput and goodput. It is unclear from the BtStream documentation if 
they performed any buffering, however as BtStream has less overhead, it would be possible to buffer even 
more packets with BtStream than with our protocol. Finally, it may be possible to modify the architecture 
of our mote firmware to increase performance by limiting the amount of message passing between 
modules. 
 
5.3 Untested Metrics 
  
 The following section outlines behavior or metrics that we did not observe or measure with the 
testing we carried out. In doing so, we highlight these variables and outline the potential effects of them 
within the context of our BAN. Depending on specific application of a BAN, these metrics may require 
testing before implementation. 
 
5.3.1 Packet Loss 
 
The loss of packets within the body area network is a potential adverse condition that would 
affect the operation or stability of the BAN. We were unable to actively test the effects of packet loss in 
our small-scale tests, due to reliability provided by the Bluetooth protocol. If the BAN were to suffer from 
packet loss, the two main issues that could arise are: the base station is unable to learn how to interact 
with a mote, sensor data from a mote either never makes it to the base station or is missing pieces. In the 
first situation, if the base station queries a mote for information and does not receive a response, then the 
base station can ask again after a pre-determined time out. This behavior helps to ensure that that base 
station can recover from small amounts of packet loss during the mote learning periods. In the second 
situation, if mote sensor data never makes it to the base station then the data displayed to a BAN user may 
be adversely affected. In a worst case scenario, where packet loss is 100% within the BAN, all 
communications between the base station and any connected mote would cease to work. 
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5.3.2 Transmission Distance 
 
Within a wireless network, such as our BAN, the transmission distance between nodes in the 
network is a property that will likely affect performance and operation. Communication between devices 
in the BAN are limited by the physical limits imposed by the communication medium. In the case of 
Bluetooth, the communication medium implemented in our network, the transmission range of the 
devices vary by the class of Bluetooth NIC. The Shimmer motes operate class 2 Roving Networks RN-42 
Bluetooth radios [40], which have a typical transmission range of approximately 10 meters. Under normal 
operations of the BAN, motes and the base station would likely be within that 10 meter distance. 
However, in situations where the devices stray outside that range, the quality of communications between 
nodes may degrade. 
 
5.3.3 Maximum BAN Size 
 
The maximum size of the BAN is currently limited largely by the communication protocol 
utilized, namely Bluetooth. A Bluetooth piconet consists of 1 master device and up to 7 slave devices 
under standard operation. In the case of the BAN, the base station acts the master while motes act as 
slaves. As a result, the maximum size of the BAN is limited to 8 devices. This limitation could be solved 
by the creation of a Bluetooth scatternet. The scalability of Bluetooth is discussed in C.3 Bluetooth 
Scalability. 
 
5.3.4 BAN Goodput Over Time (Plug and Play Protocol Overhead) 
 
The BAN goodput is defined as the throughput excluding any of the overhead associated with 
making the BAN plug and play e.g. the protocol overhead. The protocol overhead is necessary for the 
plug and play operation within our BAN. The amount of overhead is not static however, due to the 
variable properties of protocol packets. As a result, the effects of different amounts of protocol overhead 
could affect the performance of the BAN. Larger packets may take longer to process or require more CPU 
and battery usage to handle on both the mote and base station. In addition to the headers, there are control 
messages that need to be sent at the beginning of each connection to a mote. These messages allow the 
base station to learn what the mote is capable of. Due to this constraint, the goodput will start at 0% at the 
beginning of the connection, rapidly increasing after the control message discussion has been finished. In 
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most situations, the goodput will approach the throughput, as if the control messages were not needed. 
However, in extreme situations where motes are being changed constantly, or there is a high amount of 
packet loss, the control messages may still account of a large portion of BAN traffic.  
 
5.3.5 CPU Usage 
 
The CPU usage of both the mote firmware and the base station application was not a metric 
which we measured as part of the performance analysis of the BAN. While we was did not explore a CPU 
stress test of the base station or motes, such stress if high enough could affect the performance of the 
BAN. A mote that is overwhelmed in terms of CPU usage may be unable to process or response to 
requests or commands from the base station. A base station that is CPU overwhelmed may be able to 
process or display mote information or sensor data to a BAN user. Relative to Shimmer’s BtStream 
firmware, the CPU usage is most likely higher due to the plug and play protocol overhead. The effect on 
CPU performance can be seen indirectly through the BAN lifetime results. A lower battery life would 
suggest that the firmware utilizes more resources than a firmware without plug and play overhead. 
  
5.3.6 Data Streaming Latency 
 
 As opposed to control message latency, data streaming latency is the additional time it takes for a 
sample to be processed and sent to the base station. After the first packet, there is no explicit request sent 
for mote data. The mote simply collects another sample and sends it out without having to be instructed to 
do so. The mote can immediately act without waiting for request, so we expected the latency to be less 
than that of the observed control message latency. During our tests, it seemed the latency was almost non-
existent. This is most likely due to timing imprecision either on the base station, the motes, or both. 
Currently, our results suggest that the data streaming latency is significantly less than control message 
latency, but the data is not precise enough to give a definitive answer. Any significant overhead in 
operating a BAN with our protocol will likely be introduced in the processing of control messages, the 
performance of which was evaluated in 5.2 Test Results 
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6. BAN Plug and Play Analysis 
 
In order to evaluate the plug and play capabilities of previous Body Area Networks and our BAN, 
we generated the following rubric. Our understanding of the requirements for a BAN to be plug and play 
defined the criteria below. By our definition, a BAN is perfectly plug and play if the BAN configuration 
can change without any user effort. User effort includes new implementation, physical labor, or 
interactions with the base station application. For each criterion, we provide a range of possible amounts 
of user effort. This ranges from absolutely no effort, to the theoretical maximum work required. This 
allows for a more detailed evaluation beyond a series of pass or fails conditions. If a BAN meets the best 
case for each criterion, we consider it to be perfectly plug and play; there is no way to make it more plug 
and play according to our definition. 
 
Criteria Grading 
Work required to add new mote to BAN Scale (1 = Best, 4 = Worst) 
1. Connect mote to Base Station 
2. Flash mote with firmware before connecting to base station 
3. Update base station software before connecting mote 
4. Flash mote and update base station software before connecting mote 
Work required to change sensor on mote Checklist (Less checks the better) 
➢ Physically change sensor 
➢ Disconnect / reconnect mote 
➢ Flash mote 
➢ Update base station software 
Work required to replace one mote with another in 
an operating BAN (assuming both motes are 
running firmware compatible with BAN) 
Scale (1 = Best, 2 = Worst) 
1. Disconnect old mote, connect new mote 
2. Disconnect old mote, update base station software, connect new mote 
Work required to add a completely new sensor to 
the BAN 
Checklist (Less checks the better) 
➢ Flash existing motes 
➢ Update a small portion of the existing mote firmware (less than 25% of 
modules) 
➢ Update a large portion of the existing mote firmware 
➢ Update a small portion of the existing Base Station software (less than 
25% of classes) 
➢ Update a large portion of the existing Base Station software 
➢ Updating the application layer protocol (new IDs for packet headers) 
Work required to change the functionality of an 
existing sensor in the BAN 
Checklist (Less checks the better) 
➢ Flash existing motes 
➢ Update a small portion of the existing mote firmware (less than 25% of 
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modules) 
➢ Update a large portion of the existing mote firmware 
➢ Update a small portion of the existing Base Station software (less than 
25% of classes) 
➢ Update a large portion of the existing Base Station software 
➢ Updating the application layer protocol (new IDs for packet headers) 
Lines of code required to add a new command to a 
sensor 
Scale (1 = Best, 4 = Worst) 
1. Less than 100 lines 
2. 100 - 500 lines 
3. 500 - 1000 lines 
More than 1000 lines 
Lines of code required to add a new sensor the 
BAN 
Scale (1 = Best, 4 = Worst) 
1. Less than 100 lines 
2. 100 - 500 lines 
3. 500 - 1000 lines 
More than 1000 lines 
Table 6:  Plug and Play Rubric 
 
6.1 Plug and Play Evaluation: Shimmer BtStream vs. Our BAN Protocol 
 
The table below displays rankings for both Shimmer’s BtStream firmware and our plug and play 
protocol firmware using the plug and play rubric described above. 
 
 Shimmer BtStream Firmware Our BAN Firmware 
Criteria  Grading Grading 
Work required to add 
new mote to BAN 
  Scale (1 = Best, 4 = Worst) 
4. Flash mote and update base station 
software before connecting mote 
Scale (1 = Best, 4 = Worst) 
2. Flash mote with firmware before connecting to 
base station 
Work required to change 
sensor on mote 
  Checklist (Less checks the better) 
✓ Physically change sensor 
✓ Disconnect / reconnect mote 
○ Flash mote 
✓ Update base station software 
Checklist (Less checks the better) 
✓ Physically change sensor 
✓ Disconnect / reconnect mote 
✓ Flash mote 
○ Update base station software 
Work required to replace 
one mote with another in 
an operating BAN 
(assuming both motes 
are running firmware 
compatible with BAN) 
 Scale (1 = Best, 2 = Worst) 
1. Disconnect old mote, connect new 
mote 
Scale (1 = Best, 2 = Worst) 
1. Disconnect old mote, connect new mote 
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Work required to add a 
completely new sensor 
to the BAN 
  Checklist (Less checks the better) 
○ Flash existing motes 
✓ Update a small portion of the existing 
mote firmware (less than 25% of 
modules) 
✓ Update a large portion of the existing 
mote firmware 
✓ Update a small portion of the existing 
Base Station software (less than 25% 
of classes) 
✓ Update a large portion of the existing 
Base Station software 
✓ Updating the application layer protocol 
(new IDs for packet headers) 
Checklist (Less checks the better) 
○ Flash existing motes 
✓ Update a small portion of the existing mote 
firmware (less than 25% of modules) 
○ Update a large portion of the existing mote 
firmware 
○ Update a small portion of the existing Base 
Station software (less than 25% of classes) 
○ Update a large portion of the existing Base 
Station software 
○ Updating the application layer protocol (new 
IDs for packet headers) 
Work required to change 
the functionality of an 
existing sensor in the 
BAN 
  Checklist (Less checks the better) 
○ Flash existing motes 
✓ Update a small portion of the existing 
mote firmware (less than 25% of 
modules) 
✓ Update a large portion of the existing 
mote firmware 
✓ Update a small portion of the existing 
Base Station software (less than 25% 
of classes) 
○ Update a large portion of the existing 
Base Station software 
✓ Updating the application layer protocol 
(new IDs for packet headers) 
Checklist (Less checks the better) 
○ Flash existing motes 
✓ Update a small portion of the existing mote 
firmware (less than 25% of modules) 
○ Update a large portion of the existing mote 
firmware 
○ Update a small portion of the existing Base 
Station software (less than 25% of classes) 
○ Update a large portion of the existing Base 
Station software 
○ Updating the application layer protocol (new 
IDs for packet headers) 
Lines of code required 
to add a new command 
to a sensor 
  Scale (1 = Best, 4 = Worst) 
2. 100 - 500 lines 
Scale (1 = Best, 4 = Worst) 
1. Less than 100 lines 
Lines of code required 
to add a new sensor the 
BAN 
  Scale (1 = Best, 4 = Worst) 
4. More than 1000 lines 
Scale (1 = Best, 4 = Worst) 
2. 100 - 500 lines 
Table 7: Plug and Play Evaluation: BtStream vs. Our BAN 
 
Although the Shimmer BtStream firmware allows for a functional BAN, it is not plug-and-play as 
can be seen in Table 7 above. Adding a new sensor requires writing a large amount of code, both for the 
mote and base station. The protocol relies heavily on hard-coded values, and has no ability to dynamically 
add or change functionality in the BAN. Finally, the firmware is designed to operate on a select group of 
devices, all of which are created by Shimmer; devices from other manufacturers could not operate in the 
same BAN. 
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 Even though we attempted to develop a completely plug and play BAN, there are still areas that 
need improvement. Despite the fact that less work is needed to add a new mote to the BAN, the mote still 
needs to be flashed with the plug and play firmware. It may be possible to avoid this by having the mote 
automatically flashed somehow, possibly over air. Physically changing a sensor still requires a large 
amount of manual labor, mostly because the Shimmer hardware platform does not support automatic 
recognition of daughter board sensors. There is no way for the mote to tell which specific sensors are 
currently connected to the MSP430. Since the mote has to be flashed with the firmware for the proper 
sensors, the mote will also have to disconnect from the BAN. Luckily, no work has to be done to replace 
a mote in the BAN, since the base station can just relearn from the new mote when it connects. The 
greatest optimization seems to be in the amount of software development needed to extend the BAN. To 
add a new sensor to the ban, significantly less lines of code are needed, as well as fewer modules needing 
to be created or updated. Even less programming is required to just update the functionality of an existing 
sensor, because most of the labor is spent on designing the Inquiry command responses. Unlike 
Shimmer’s firmware, our codebase is separated into many modules, with attempts to reuse modules and 
code wherever possible. We hope moving to other TinyOS platforms and further refactoring of our 
codebase will allow for greater flexibility and a better score on the rubric in the future.  
7. Conclusion 
 
The goal of this project was to design and carry out an initial implementation of a body area 
network protocol with a focus on plug and play. By incorporating a plug and play protocol into a body 
area network, the interactions between devices in the network can be simplified and streamlined. The 
protocol we designed succeeds at enabling a base station device to dynamically learn about mote 
capabilities and how to interact with them. No prior knowledge of the mote is required. The testing 
performed demonstrates that the protocol can be implemented and utilized with minimal impact on 
overall BAN performance. We believe that this protocol provides a solid foundation for any future 
commercial or research BAN development. 
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8. Future Work 
 
The following details possible avenues of future work, and poses some questions for future 
researchers. In general, we thought that security would be a desirable next step in research. The 
combination of this project with a secure BAN would bring body area networks closer to practical, day to 
day use. We also described some concerns we had with our choices and left suggestions for future 
researchers to avoid the same minor setbacks. 
  
8.1 Threat Modeling 
 
 If a future project was to focus on adding security to this BAN, it would be best to understand the 
security of the system in its current state. In order to do that, it would be best to use a systematic threat 
modeling and vulnerability identification approach. This will allow a concrete representation to “consider 
the design of the entire system, and not incorporate security technologies at random” [41]. We created a 
preliminary threat model for our BAN which can be found in appendix D.1 Threat Model We believe this 
to be the next step towards developing security for the current BAN platform. 
 
8.2 Embedded System Cryptography 
 
 Security and cryptography were not within the scope of the project’s implementation.. It is not 
hard to imagine that the security may be desired or in fact required within the context of a wireless sensor 
network, especially a body area network where the transmission of medical or other potentially sensitive 
information may occur. As a result, the implementation of application layer security on top of a body area 
network protocol is an area of interest. However, there are some issues that may need to be investigated. 
First, the sensor motes currently have severely limited computational and storage resources. The 
MSP430F1611 microcontrollers in the Shimmer motes have an 8 MHz processor, 48kB flash memory, 
and only 10kB RAM. Second, the firmware on the motes is implemented on the TinyOS platform using 
the nesC language. We have included some possible options for the Shimmer motes in appendix D.2 
Embedded System Cryptography Libraries. However, if new mote platforms are integrated, these 
suggestions may not fit the new specifications. If future groups strive to implement cryptographically 
secure transmissions, they may want to focus on what to use for the motes.  
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8.3 Honeypot 
 
A honeypot could be used to provide additional security to a BAN. Since a BAN usually consists 
of mobile, battery powered devices, a passive security model offers many benefits. A honeypot device 
would not require much resource utilization unless there is a present threat. Additionally, a honeypot 
would behave in a simpler manner than more active security measures, such as an intrusion detection 
system: there is no need for intensive packet sniffing and analysis with a honeypot. This means less 
computation, and therefore less battery power, is required to evaluate threats. We believe if a future group 
was to look into implementing security on top of this BAN protocol that the integration of a honeypot 
device should be considered. We recommend in-depth research on honeypots be carried out. In particular, 
some major aspects we believe could be addressed are: where a honeypot would be fit inside a BAN (e.g. 
what device a honeypot would operate on), how a honeypot would behave in a BAN, what information 
the honeypot would collect, as well as how that information would be used. 
 
8.4 Alternative Communication 
 
 We used Bluetooth to connect our sensors with the base station. This decision was made because 
Bluetooth-enabled Android devices are readily available, and the Shimmer platform also supported 
Bluetooth. However, there are significant limitations which detract from the usefulness offered by the 
ubiquity of Bluetooth. A standard Bluetooth network is made up of individual connections between 
devices. As such, there is no way for a control device, such as a base station, to broadcast data to all 
connected devices. Similarly, it would be difficult to interconnect all the sensor platforms in our BAN, as 
Bluetooth pairings need at least a small amount of human interaction on one of the connecting devices, 
something not possible with our platform. Finally, the size of a Bluetooth network is limited to one 
Piconet, which can consist of one master, in our case the base station, and up to seven active slave 
devices. In order to increase the number of active devices in a Bluetooth network, some slave devices 
have to act as masters for a separate piconet, and relay all messages between them. This introduces 
additional overhead to those intermediary devices, which will reduce battery life and possibly impact 
performance. 
 One alternative that may scale better is IEEE 802.15.4 ZigBee [13]. By design, ZigBee is a mesh 
network with no central controller. ZigBee devices can transmit at a maximum of 250 kbps in the 2.4GHz 
band. The Shimmer platforms used for this BAN support ZigBee, however we were unable to locate a 
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ZigBee enabled Android device. In the future, there may be other mobile platforms with ZigBee 
available, or adapters to add ZigBee radios to mobile platforms.  
 The other alternative we found was Bluetooth Low Energy [42] (BLE). This is part of the 
Bluetooth 4.0 standard, but is not backwards compatible with previous Bluetooth 3.0 devices. BLE 
introduced the idea of device profiles, which generalize how the device performs. Many profiles already 
exist for healthcare related devices.  The BLE protocol has specifications for different message types, 
including device state changes and data transmissions. This may make it easier to handle different types 
of messages arriving from multiple sources. 
 Future research projects using this platform may find it beneficial to investigate an alternative 
form of wireless communication. In addition, supporting multiple protocols enables multiple mote 
platforms to be integrated, regardless of their communication mechanism. While there are a few 
alternative options currently, the list may change in the future. Furthermore, the issues presented may be 
addressed, possibly making previous options more desirable. The choice of communication platform 
should be left up to future projects depending on their specific needs and limitations.  
 
8.5 Alternative Sensing Platforms 
 
While Shimmer provided a stable platform for development, there were some key features left to 
desire. The open source code and sensor documentation seemed less detailed than advertised. Many 
development steps for sensors involved reverse engineering the sparsely commented codebase because 
there were no specifications available. Additionally, any usage of existing Shimmer modules in the 
TinyOS platform led to trial and error because the modules were also underspecified. Having a platform 
with a plethora of schematics and input-output descriptions would have streamlined the development 
process. Having a TinyOS platform that supports simulation would have greatly reduced debugging time. 
Many TinyOS hardware platforms, such as the TelosB mote support simulation. This allows the mote 
firmware to be directly run on the development PC, with likely access to a debugger like GDB. Other 
platforms support debugging through connecting the mote to the development PC. The code can be 
debugged on the PC while it is executed on the native hardware. Since Shimmer did not support this, 
many problems had to be investigated through trial and error, alert statements, and logging. We 
recommend that future work should integrate a mote platform that better meets these needs.  
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8.6 Expanding the Plug and Play Protocol 
 
We believe that there is significant potential for future extensions to this preliminary protocol and 
implementation. In particular, incorporating security on top of the protocol would increase the appeal for 
usage in a commercial body area network. Some starting points in regards to application security for 
TinyOS were outlined above in section 8.2. In addition, implementation and testing of the protocol on a 
multi-hop scatternet or larger-scale networks would serve to further validate the architecture. Inter-mote 
communication could be explored and would likely be required for an implementation of a multi-hop 
network or scatternet. The ability to update the plug and play protocol on-the-fly is a big area of potential 
expansion and experimentation. In particular, the ability to modify the grammars used to communicate 
information between the motes and the base station during BAN operation. Whatever future projects 
decide to approach, this body area network protocol should be flexible enough to use as a foundation.  
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Appendices 
 
These appendices detail supplementary information that interested readers may find useful. These 
summaries may be useful to any future research teams looking to extend or our efforts. Section Appendix 
A: Shimmer includes our initial research into the Shimmer platform. Section Appendix B: Android 
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Research contains an overview of the Android device used as our base station, as well as a brief security 
analysis. Section Appendix C: Bluetooth has a brief overview of Bluetooth security, reliability, and 
scalability. Finally, Section Appendix D: BAN Security contains a security analysis of BANs in general, 
as well as some potential mitigation techniques. 
Appendix A: Shimmer 
 
 Following is an inventory and analysis of the out-of-the-box capabilities of our mote platform. 
 
A.1 Mote Baseboards and Expansions 
 
The Shimmer sensor platform development kit includes 6 baseboards as well as six different 
sensor hardware expansion modules. Shimmer uses a modular system in that different expansion modules 
can be attached quickly and easily to a baseboard platform. This makes swapping modules and 
constructing a variety of mote configurations straightforward. The baseboard consists of a few major 
components, an MSP430 microcontroller, an expansion connector, and one built-in accelerometer sensor. 
On its own, a baseboard platform with no attached modules can be used as a basic sensing platform using 
the built-in accelerometer sensor. However, Shimmer includes a variety of expansion modules, which 
greatly increase the capabilities and applications of the sensor platforms. These expansion modules are 
separate boards that are simply attached to the baseboard and extend the sensing capabilities of the default 
device. The following is an overview of each of the six sensor expansion modules Shimmer provides and 
their applications: 
1. Galvanic Skin Response (GSR) Module: the GSR sensor measures skin conductivity between two 
electrodes (not included) attached to two fingers on one hand. 
2. Electrocardiogram (ECG) Module: the ECG sensor records the electrical activity through the 
heart muscles over a period of time using multiple electrodes (not included) attached to the skin. 
3. Electromyogram (EMG) Module: the EMG sensor measures electrical activity associated with 
muscle contractions using electrodes (not included) attached to the skin. 
4. Strain Gauge Module: the strain gauge sensor enables the measurement of strain and force 
utilizing an attached load cell or other instrument (not included). 
5. 9 Degrees of Freedom (9DoF) Module: the 9DoF expansion measures static and dynamic 
orientation data, inertial measurement, and complex 3D motion sensing. This expansion consists of both a 
gyroscope and magnetometer sensor. 
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6. GPS Module: the GPS sensor provides GPS data, barometric pressure, and temperature 
measurements. 
 
 For the expansion modules that require electrodes to record sensor data, such as the GSR, ECG, 
and EMG modules, we researched and invested in compatible electrodes to enable us to both test those 
modules during development as well as make demonstrations of the system possible. The strain gauge 
module requires the usage of an external instrument such as a load cell to measure force data. Research 
was done into compatible load cells that could be used in the BAN with limited success. The vast 
majority of available load cells and force gauges are built for and used in industrial, automotive, or highly 
specific mechanical applications such as inside machinery. With such a limited availability of both 
compatible and usable load cells it was decided to not utilize the strain gauge mote for its original 
purpose. This mote could be used as a replacement, or possibly a BAN level monitor.  
 
A.2 Android Driver and SDK 
 
Shimmer Sensing provides an Android Instrument Driver [43] free of charge to anyone with an 
account on shimmersensing.com. This driver is intended to simplify the development process when 
creating android applications that interact with Shimmer sensors. We downloaded the driver, which came 
with the source code for several android applications designed to test the Shimmer sensors. We were able 
to compile and deploy one of these applications to the base station phone to verify that it could 
communicate and interact with the sensors appropriately.  
 
A.3 Shimmer BtStream Analysis 
 
 Originally named BoilerPlate, BtStream is the most robust firmware included with the Shimmer 
Sensing platform. Intended for commercial use, installing and using the firmware requires no technical 
knowledge beyond interacting with a USB hub on a pc, and operating a basic Bluetooth device. Once the 
mote is programmed, the user must also install and run one of Shimmer’s stock applications on the device 
they intend to use as a base station. Anyone who can pair a Bluetooth headset with their smartphone or 
laptop, and download an application should have no issues getting the shimmer mote streaming sensor 
data to their chosen base station. 
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 Shimmer has included a BtStream user guide [4] as well as a Shimmer Revision 2 user guide [40] 
to answer any questions about using the firmware, or get developers started on building their own 
firmware and base station application. Since the firmware was intended for commercial use, both guides 
do not go into intensive technical detail; those details are better found in their code documentation and 
BtStream GitHub repository [44]. Commands sent to and from the mote are split into five subsections: set 
commands, get commands, action commands, acknowledgements, and streaming data. Set commands 
simply set what is specified, followed by the value to set it to on the mote. Examples of set commands 
include sensor calibrations, buffer sizes, sampling rates, and sensor ranges. Action commands are merely 
a subset of set commands that do not require values to be set; the mote is still instructed to do something, 
but it does not require additional information following the command. These include toggling the mote’s 
LED, as well as starting and stopping sensor data streaming. Get commands are simple inquires to the 
mote to retrieve information, such as the current sensor configuration or mote sampling rate. When a mote 
receives and processes a command, it will always send an acknowledgement back to the base station. If it 
was a get command, the mote will also include the data requested from the base station. Streaming data 
packets are simply the sensor data sent to the base station. The packet structure is agnostic to which 
sensor is sending data, and either sends 8-bit or 16-bit values.  
 
 
Figure 45: BtStream State Transition Table 
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The firmware separates the mote’s behavior into three distinct states. In the disconnected state, 
the mote simply waits to be paired with. It will only enter discoverable mode to advertise itself in limited 
intervals to save battery. However, it will respond to any scanning requests received. Once the base 
station has paired and opened a serial socket connection with the mote, the mote will enter the connected 
state. In this state, the mote can process set, get, and action commands from the base station. The mote 
will return to the disconnected state if the socket is ever closed. If the mote receives a start streaming 
action command, it will enter the streaming state.  In the streaming state, the mote will send streaming 
data to the base station; however, the mote can also still process set commands if on-the-fly configuration 
is necessary. 
Overall, the BtStream firmware is designed well for commercial or basic academic purposes. 
Using the BtStream firmware and Multi-Shimmer Sync for Windows, Shimmer reports that most of their 
BAN tests could only reach a sampling frequency of 512 Hz without packet loss (the best case being 1024 
Hz, worst case being 256 Hz). Similar lab tests show a streaming latency of 100±50ms. The battery life of 
each mote using BtStream ranged from 10.5 hours to almost 18 hours. The packet structure and behavior 
state abstractions worked nicely, making it easy to understand, and presumably easier to implement as 
well. 
Notwithstanding, there are a number of potential downsides of the BtStream firmware. First off, 
security was not in the scope at all for designing this firmware. If this firmware was to be used for a Body 
Area Network outside an academic environment, transmissions could be easily intercepted and altered. 
Integrity is of utmost concern for a BAN consisting of medical devices. Secondly, the base station 
commands are overly agnostic: meaning, you can send a set command to enable a sensor that a mote 
doesn’t have, or receive data and not necessarily know what sensor that data belongs to. Additionally, 
many of the packet structures have wasted space for future use. If we were to use the packet structures as 
a foundation for extensions, there would be much unnecessary overhead incurred. 
 
Appendix B: Android Research 
 
 Below was some initial research done on our base station choice and security capabilities of the 
Android platform.  
 
B.1 Nexus 4 / Android 4.3 Setup and Initial Testing 
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The base station of this BAN was a Google Nexus 4 Phone, running Android 4.2. This phone was 
selected because it has modern hardware, and runs the most recent version of the Android Operating 
System. Most cell phone carriers add additional software or features to phones that they sell. By 
purchasing the Nexus 4 directly from Google and without a cellular contract one can avoid limitations 
imposed by carriers.  
The phone was updated to Android 4.3, which was the latest version available at the beginning of 
the project. This was done to add support for developing for Bluetooth Low Energy (BLE) devices, 
however we later discovered that the sensor platforms used were not BLE compliant. We were able to set 
up an Android development environment [34] on their computers, and deploy a test application to the 
base station to verify that the phone and development environments both behaved as expected. No further 
testing was performed before beginning development. 
 
B.2 Application Security 
 
 We researched application security on Android devices. As the BAN is intended to collect 
medical data, the privacy and integrity of that data was to be kept paramount. Ideally, the application 
would run in an Android Virtual Machine on the base station, where it could be isolated from all other 
applications and processes on the phone. Unfortunately, there were no working implementations of 
Android VM’s that ran on mobile devices available during the project.  
 Android applications often require the user to grant certain permissions when they are installed 
for the first time. As our application requires the use of the Bluetooth adapter, it must request the 
BLUETOOTH permission. Similarly, as the application is supposed to be able to enable and disable the 
blue tooth adapter, it requires the BLUETOOTH_ADMIN permission. A full list of these permissions and 
the associated access provided can be found on the Android Developer website [45]. When installing an 
application, a user must either accept all permissions requested by that application, or refuse and not let 
the application be installed. There is no mechanism to accept a partial permission list. By requiring the 
user to grant these permissions, the user is informed of the control the application will have on the host 
device. 
 Android does provide a reasonable level of security and isolation for individual applications. 
Each app runs in a unique Dalvik Virtual Machine. No communication between DVM’s is possible unless 
desired by the application developers. Furthermore, any files created on the phone’s internal storage will 
only be accessible to the application that created it. However, any data stored on external storage, such as 
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a Micro-SD card, could be read by any application with the appropriate permissions [46]. In order to 
increase the privacy of the data collected, we decided that any data stored should be kept on the internal 
storage of the phone. If any information must be stored on the phone’s external storage, that information 
should be encrypted to prevent other applications from reading it. 
 
Appendix C: Bluetooth 
  
 The following sections describe the benefits and disadvantages of Bluetooth from three different 
perspectives. Each of these criteria is paramount for the robustness of a communication protocol. 
  
C.1 Bluetooth Security 
 
 The Bluetooth protocol, as of version 2.1, claims to provide Authentication and Confidentiality. 
The Bluetooth stack implemented on the Shimmer devices are 2.1 compliant, which allowed us to take 
advantage of the increased security provided over previous versions of the protocol. 
 Pairing two devices is the first step that must be taken before they can communicate with 
Bluetooth. Version 2.1 of the protocol introduced Secure Simple Pairing (SSP) [47]. SSP uses a Diffie-
Hellman key exchange to negotiate an encryption key between the two devices that are being paired. 
Previous versions of Bluetooth required the user to enter a PIN of varying length on both devices. That 
PIN was then used as input to an algorithm which generated an encryption key. With SSP, the PIN 
displayed is only for the user to confirm the identity of the devices being paired, it is not used as part of 
the key generation. 
There are four major association models that can be used to perform the pairing, each requiring 
varying levels of human interaction. As the shimmer devices have no display, and cannot accept input, the 
BAN relies on the Just Works association model, which requires no pairing confirmation from the user. 
This means that this BAN is vulnerable to passive eavesdropping and man-in-the-middle attacks during 
the pairing process, where other association models can mitigate those threats. 
 Bluetooth 2.1 requires Security Mode 4, which causes all communications to be encrypted. The 
only exception is the Discovery service, which is responsible for finding other active Bluetooth devices 
that can be paired. Previous versions of Bluetooth supported only up to Security Mode 3, which did not 
require all types of communication to be encrypted. Bluetooth 2.1 will fall back to a lower security mode 
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only when pairing with a legacy device. After the devices are paired, or associated, the encryption key 
created is known as the link key, and will be used to encrypt all further communication between the two 
devices. 
 Authentication is provided by a challenge-response scheme, where either member of a Bluetooth 
pair can challenge the identity of the other member. The challenger is referred to as a verifier, and the 
device being challenged is known as the claimant. The claimant proves its identity to the verifier by 
performing a variation of the SAFER+ algorithm known as the E1 algorithm to generate a response to the 
verifier using the claimant’s Bluetooth address and the link key. The verifier performs the same 
calculation, and compares the claimant’s response with the expected result. If they are different, the 
claimant fails verification, and no further communication from the claimant to the verifier will be 
accepted until the claimant can complete verification. As the link key is critical for performing 
authentication, it must be kept private in order to maintain a valid authentication routine. Unfortunately, 
as this BAN uses the Just Works association model, it is possible for a third party to obtain the link key 
by using a man-in-the-middle attack, and as such, the BAN cannot rely on this Bluetooth authentication 
method. 
 To provide confidentiality, Bluetooth 2.1 requires that all transmitted data payloads be encrypted. 
This is done with a stream cipher seeded by the link key, a pseudo-random number, and part of the 
response to an authentication challenge. However, as this BAN cannot guarantee the privacy of the link 
key due to the use of the Just Works association model, the BAN cannot rely on the encryption provided 
by Bluetooth. If a third party was able to obtain the link key through a man-in-the-middle attack, they 
could potentially decrypt all communications between the two hosts in the pairing. Furthermore, the 
length of the encryption key can vary from 8 to 128 bits depending on the manufacturer of the Bluetooth 
adapter. We were unable to determine the length of the key required either by the Shimmer devices or the 
base station. Finally, the encryption algorithm used, E0, which is again a variation of the SAFER+ 
algorithm, has not been FIPS approved. For these reasons we decided that encryption would have to be 
implemented at the application layer in order to maintain reasonable confidentiality. The data will still be 
further encrypted by Bluetooth as required by the 2.1 protocol. 
 Bluetooth 2.1 does not provide any methods for verifying data integrity, or non-repudiation. 
Without integrity verification, it is possible for an attacker to tamper with data being sent between 
devices. Although the attacker may not be able to decrypt the data being sent, sending false data in this 
BAN could cause the user to make incorrect medical decisions based on the false data [48]. 
C.2 Bluetooth Reliability 
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Bluetooth was selected as the method for wireless communication, so further research was 
required into what features were provided for in the specification. Among the features that were 
researched was the reliability of the communications sent over Bluetooth. Currently, reliability is not an 
issue, because the motes are sending data to the base station so quickly that a dropped packet here or there 
will not make a difference. However, not all of the future communications will be a stream of data. Some 
will be just a one-time message which could cause issues if it was lost.  
Fortunately, Bluetooth includes a variety of features to make sure that the message you sent is 
received correctly. In order to help with interference, Bluetooth employs Adaptive Frequency Hopping 
(AFH). AFH allows the communication to move to the least congested 1 MHz channel in the 2402 MHz 
to 2480 MHz range. Of course, there is going to be some level of interference on every channel, so 
Bluetooth also includes error correction, and by extension detection. Specifically, Forward Error 
Correction (FEC) is used. FEC has been in use for decades, and as the name implies, gives the receiver of 
a transmission the ability to fix some errors without the need for retransmission. In addition, Bluetooth 
also uses ARQ retransmission. Every packet that is sent has an ACK/NAK bit which makes it possible to 
determine if a packet needs to be resent. Even if a packet was completely lost, you would still know, and 
would be able to resend the data.  
 
C.3 Bluetooth Scalability 
 
 The scalability of Bluetooth networks, although not the main focus of the project, was considered 
and researched. While we were not concerned with developing or implementing a scaled Bluetooth 
network for the project, the ability for such networks to be formed was still relevant and of interest to the 
project. In the future if the size of the body area network needed or wanted to be increase, we wanted to 
ascertain if doing so would be possible. The Bluetooth protocol itself was first looked at to establish if it 
specified a scaled Bluetooth network or facilitated the development of one. 
In the Bluetooth protocol the smallest network of devices is called a piconet. A piconet is an ad-
hoc single-hop computer network that consists of a total of eight devices. Within a piconet one active 
device is the master and up to seven other active devices are slaves. Slave devices only communicate with 
the master device and do not as result directly communicate with other slaves. While the Bluetooth 
specification does not define or describe how piconets should be scaled, it does not prevent the formation 
of larger Bluetooth networks. In addition, the Bluetooth protocol does provide features that help facilitate 
the creation of bigger Bluetooth networks. The idea behind scaling Bluetooth networks is to connect 
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piconets together to form what is called a scatternet. The formation of scatternets is possible due to a 
number of properties of the Bluetooth protocol. A Bluetooth device is capable of being a master of one 
piconet but a slave in multiple piconets at a time. This enables connections between piconets to be made 
by utilizing devices that are members of multiple piconets. In addition, up to 255 slave devices can be set 
in what is called a parked state within a piconet. When in a parked state the device is not active within the 
piconet but is not unpaired from the master of the piconet. This enables devices to overcome the protocol 
limitation that they may only communicate in one piconet at a time. A device can switch between a 
parked and active state in multiple piconets in order to communicate within both. 
After examining the Bluetooth protocol, research into the scalability of Bluetooth networks was carried 
out to see if any research or work existed on the subject. Research found focused on proposed scatternet 
formation, routing, and management protocols, associated algorithms, and network simulations utilizing 
different network topologies. For example, Bluetooth scatternets with star topologies called “BlueStars” 
are described in Petrioli et al.’s paper “Configuring BlueStars: Multi-hop Scatternet Formation for 
Bluetooth Networks” [49] Two other papers, by Lin et al. [50] and Záruba et al. [51] detailed protocols 
and experimentation for creating scatternets with ring and tree topologies respectively. Other research 
focused on subjects such as: specific formation algorithms for usage in scatternets [52], mesh scatternets 
[53], and the general suitability of Bluetooth for large-scale networks [54]. Through this research it was 
determined that while the creation and management of Bluetooth scatternets is certainly possible, and 
significant efforts in this area has been carried out, that currently there is no definitive protocol or 
framework that exists for doing so. 
 
Appendix D: BAN Security 
 
 Our team performed a security analysis to identify potential security risks in a BAN. We also 
researched tools that may be used to mitigate some of those risks. Due to time constraints, we were unable 
to deploy any of these countermeasures in our BAN implementation. 
  
D.1 Threat Model 
 
We created a preliminary threat model, used to identify possible threats to the system and the 
technologies. An effort was made not to restrict analysis to just those threats that conceivably could be 
exploited by an adversary but to any and all potential threats to the system. At the same time, because of 
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the unpredictable nature of a potential attacker, we attempted to avoid predicting or assuming an 
adversary’s behavior. The threat modeling consisted of the following stages: 
1. Define, identify, and document system assets. 
 The first stage centered on establishing what resources have value within the context of the 
system and which therefore would need to be protected from threats and attacks. This step enabled us to 
accrue a concrete set of aspects within the system that needed to be analyzed further in terms of security. 
The following is the list of assets pinpointed within the system: 
 Mote Local Data (SD Card Storage) 
 Mote System Resources 
 Mote Bluetooth Transmissions (Packet Data) 
 Base Station Local Data (Internal / SD Card External Storage) 
 Base Station System Resources 
 Base Station Transmissions (Packet Data) 
2. Pinpoint who and what is trusted within the system. 
  After documenting the assets, we then moved on to determining what entities within the body 
area network could or could not be trusted. This was done in order to help decide what each entity in the 
system should and should not be able to do or have access to, as well as how interactions between 
different entities would need to be handled. It was concluded that the only entity within the BAN that 
would be trusted was the base station, called the “central point of trust”. Within the context of the 
network, the base station is the master device of the single Bluetooth piconet and interfaces with each 
slave mote. No other entities within the system are trusted. 
3. Determine the relevant security goals. 
 This stage involved establishing the important properties of the system that must be addressed. 
These security goals, confidentiality, integrity, and availability, are relevant to almost any computer-
related system and the body area network is no exception. In addition to those three goals, it was also 
determined that authentication and authorization would be integral properties of the system and should be 
addressed. Below each term is defined within the context of an asset or entity in a system. 
➔ Confidentiality: For an asset to be confidential means that the asset is only 
accessed by authorized entities. An entity that should not be able to access an asset therefore 
should not be able to do so.  
➔ Integrity: An asset can only be altered by authorized entities. 
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➔ Availability: For an asset to be available means that the asset can be accessed by 
authorized entities. An asset should not be prevented from being accessed by an entity that should 
be able to do so. 
➔ Authentication: For an entity to be authenticated means that it has been 
determined that the entity is who or what it claims to be.  
➔ Authorization: For an entity to be authorized means that the entity has been 
granted or denied access to an asset within the system. 
 After determining the security goals outlined above, the group analyzed different aspects of the 
body area network system and incorporated technologies in relation to each security goal. In doing so we 
pinpointed specific vulnerabilities associated with each security goal for each aspect of the system. All the 
information gathered was compiled into the following two tables. The first table details security goals, 
and whether particular aspects of our BAN met those goals. The second table describes security threats 
and potential mitigation techniques. 
Security Goal ⇨ 
⇩ Aspect 
Confidentiality Integrity Availability Authentication Authorization 
Shimmer Mote 
SD Card 
None; only 
accessible by 
mote itself, 
unless a 
firmware 
implements a 
way to access 
the data via 
remote 
connection 
None; only 
accessible by 
mote itself, 
unless a 
firmware 
implements 
a way to 
access the 
data via 
remote 
connection 
An SD card has a 
limited storage 
capacity. 
n/a n/a 
Shimmer Mote 
System 
Resources 
n/a n/a The embedded 
system has a 
limited amount of 
CPU processing 
power and 
available 
memory. 
n/a  n/a 
Android Internal 
Storage 
None; only 
accessible by 
application 
storing the data 
None; only 
accessible by 
application 
storing the 
data 
None; only 
accessible by 
application 
storing the data 
n/a n/a 
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Android 
External Storage 
Android 
External storage 
is globally 
readable and 
writable 
Android 
External 
storage is 
globally 
readable and 
writable 
Android External 
storage is 
globally readable 
and writable 
n/a n/a 
Android System 
Resources 
n/a n/a The BAN 
application could 
potentially 
interfere with the 
other operations 
of the device 
n/a  n/a 
Bluetooth 
Discoverable 
Mode 
The device and 
its BT address 
are exposed to 
any Bluetooth 
device in range 
while in 
discoverable 
mode 
The contents 
of the 
advertiseme
nts and/or 
scanning 
requests 
could be 
modified 
mid-
transmission 
An discoverable 
device will 
continually 
respond to scans 
from other 
devices 
A device can 
spoof its BT 
address and 
pretend to be 
another device 
in the area 
 
n/a 
Bluetooth 
Transmissions 
Encryption 
enforced is only 
as good as the 
highest 
encryption 
supported by 
both devices; 
supported key 
length is 
between 8 and 
128-bits. 
Packet data 
can be 
modified 
mid-
transmission
; if keys are 
known, 
checksums 
can be 
modified; if 
keys are 
unknown, 
Bluetooth’s 
CRCs and 
checksum 
headers may 
not catch 
modification 
Bluetooth 
transmissions 
could be jammed 
or disrupted 
using RF 
interference 
The identity of 
the device on 
the other end 
is guaranteed 
to be the 
device you 
paired with; 
see Pairing 
vulnerabilities 
n/a 
Table 8:  BAN Security Goals Analysis Cross Table 
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Vulnerability Threats Countermeasures 
Android devices’ 
external storage is 
globally accessible.  
1. Data stored by an 
application on external storage 
can be accessed or tampered 
with by any application on the 
device, or any entity with control 
over the device.  
1. Do not use Android external 
storage to store sensitive data. 
2. Store all data using Android 
internal storage. 
3. Encrypt any data stored in internal 
storage to provide additional protection. 
External storage 
media is physically 
removable from the 
device. 
1. Any information stored 
on the external storage can be 
stolen or accessed. 
See countermeasures above. 
Bluetooth Secure 
Simple Pairing (SSP) 
does not guarantee 
authentication.  
1. A device in a pairing 
procedure can falsify its identity 
or capabilities. 
1. Prevent the ability to pair devices 
unless in a safe / private environment. 
2. Enforce usage of more secure 
Bluetooth association model(s) if feasible. 
Default Shimmer 
Mote Bluetooth Radio 
physical range 
extends far beyond 
the needs of a BAN. 
(Class 2, 10 meters) 
1. Communications within 
the effective transmission range 
of devices in the BAN can be 
intercepted/sniffed/overheard. 
1. Limit the Bluetooth transmission 
range of BAN devices. 
2. Ensure communications are 
encrypted to thwart passive eavesdropping. 
Bluetooth 
Discoverability 
Modes other than 
silent do not provide 
or guarantee privacy. 
1. A device in discoverable 
mode can be seen and connected 
to by any other device in range. 
2. A device in non-
discoverable mode can still be 
found. 
1. Avoid using discoverable mode 
unless pairing devices. 
2.4GHz ISM band is a 
shared radio band. 
1. Other devices operating 
in the shared 2.4GHz band can 
cause electromagnetic 
interference. 
1. Bluetooth protocol utilizes a 
frequency-hopping spread spectrum 
mechanism to help mitigate RF 
interference. 
Table 9: Vulnerabilities, Threats, and Countermeasures 
 
D.2 Embedded System Cryptography Libraries 
 
We briefly looked into initial cryptography system options for the motes in our BAN. The 
following were the most promising options. However, further research would be required to make a fully 
informed decision. 
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D.2.1 TinySec 
 
 The most well-known cryptographic library available for the TinyOS platform is TinySec [55]. It 
was introduced in 2003 and described as “the first fully-implemented link layer security architecture for 
wireless sensor networks” [56]. TinySec claims to address the common restrictions of sensors networks, 
specifically the severe resource constraints imposed by sensor hardware. The creators of TinySec argue 
that existing network security protocols such as SSL/TLS, SSH, and IPSec are far too heavy-weight for 
utilization in sensor networks. As a result, TinySec serves as the protocol to fill the niche requirements of 
wireless sensor networks. In addition, the authors of TinySec boast the library’s portability across 
hardware and wireless radio platforms, making it an ideal solution for a wide variety of applications.  
The TinySec library offers two forms of link layer security: authenticated encryption and 
authentication only. In the case of authenticated encryption, “TinySec encrypts the data payload and 
authenticates the packet with a MAC”, whereas with authentication only, “TinySec authenticates the 
entire packet with a MAC, but the data payload is not encrypted” [56]. Both encryption and MAC 
mechanisms utilize a block cipher, specifically the cipher block chaining (CBC) mode of operation. By 
using block ciphers for both encryption and generating MACs, TinySec reduces space require for code. 
The TinySec implementation when initially finished required 728 bytes of RAM and 7146 bytes of 
program space, but was subsequently reduced to use just 256 bytes of RAM and 8152 bytes of ROM. 
Minimal RAM and ROM usage is important in sensor networks due to hardware restrictions. For 
encryption, the Skipjack block cipher is utilized by default while the RC5 block cipher can be used as 
well. For message integrity, a CBC-MAC implementation is used. An in-depth analysis and evaluation of 
the library’s performance, such as cipher performance, throughput, latency benchmarks, energy 
consumption, and ease of use was carried out and detailed by the creators of TinySec. Testing was carried 
out on the Mica2 sensor platform, which has an 8 MHz processor, 128kB of instruction memory, 4kB of 
RAM, and 512kB of flash memory. The results of their evaluation showed promising results of minimal 
increases (~ 10% increase) in energy consumption as well as latency / transmit times over the normal 
operation metrics of the sensors. 
The TinySec security library may fill the security needs of a wireless sensor network such as a body 
area network. That being said, as it stands it is unlikely that the TinySec library would be compatible with 
this project’s protocol and firmware out of the box. Potential issues include:  
1. TinySec was implemented exclusively for TinyOS version 1.x and may not be compatible with 
the body area network protocol which is implemented on TinyOS 2.x. 
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1. To the best of our knowledge, no port of TinySec to TinyOS 2.x exists. 
2. TinySec utilizes a modified version of the default TinyOS 1.1.2 radio stack and by default does 
not support common sensor network protocol/wireless radios in usage such as ZigBee (802.15.3) 
or Bluetooth. 
1. The project’s protocol currently utilizes the Bluetooth protocol and it is likely that 
significant modifications would be required in order to get TinySec working with the 
group’s firmware and protocol. 
2. A modified version of TinySec with ZigBee support is available [57]. 
3. TinySec was evaluated on sensors with different computational resources than those currently 
utilized in the BAN and as a result may not perform the same on the Shimmer hardware or other 
hardware in the future. 
4. Issues with TinySec have been identified and documented, such as potential replay attack 
vulnerabilities [58], pitfalls of the usage of a single network-wide key system, and poor energy 
consumption [59]. 
 
The issues highlighted above are areas that would benefit from more in-depth research, testing, and 
analysis of the TinySec library. 
     
D.2.2 MiniSec 
 
 Another secure sensor network communication architecture, MiniSec [60], aims to resolve issues 
with existing architectures and protocols, specifically TinySec and ZigBee. Like TinySec, MiniSec is 
implemented for the TinyOS platform and written in nesC. All cryptographic primitives and 
implementations utilized were ported to nesC for the architecture. The creators of MiniSec argue that 
TinySec and ZigBee fall short and “are unable to achieve low energy consumption while simultaneously 
providing the three important properties of secure communication: secrecy, authentication, and message 
replay protection” [59]. Within the context of wireless sensor networks, low energy consumption is very 
important as battery life on sensors is a limited resource. While TinySec is able to achieve low energy and 
memory usage as described in the previous section, the authors of MiniSec claim that it does so by 
reducing security provided. Ideally, a protocol that achieves both low resource usage and a high level of 
security would be best suited for usage in a BAN and as for that reason MiniSec is of interest to the 
project. 
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 To achieve low energy consumption and better security, MiniSec offers two modes of operation: 
single-source unicast communication, and multi-source broadcast communication which are each 
optimized separately. Like TinySec, MiniSec utilizes a block cipher mode of operation, specifically an 
Offset CodeBook (OCB) block cipher to simultaneously achieve secrecy and authenticity of data. In 
contrast, TinySec requires two steps to achieve secrecy (CBC-encryption) and authenticity (CBC-MAC). 
As a result, TinySec requires more computation and energy usage. MiniSec does require more memory 
usage that TinySec, however the authors argue that “the design tradeoffs in MiniSec make it well-suited 
for current state-of-the-art sensor devices” [59]. The implementation of MiniSec uses 874 bytes of RAM 
and 16KB of code memory. In addition to secrecy and authenticity, MiniSec advertises weak freshness of 
messages, as well as replay protection mechanisms in both unicast and broadcast modes. 
 MiniSec was designed and developed for the popular Moteiv Telos mote platform [61]. A huge 
benefit of this fact is that the hardware of the Telos motes MiniSec used and the Shimmer motes currently 
utilized by the project are nearly identical. Like the Shimmer motes, the Telos motes feature an 8MHz TI 
MSP430 microcontroller, 48kB flash memory, and 10kB RAM. As a result, MiniSec performance 
evaluations and metrics can be easily used to give a good idea of how MiniSec would operate on 
Shimmer motes or similar hardware. 
 MiniSec’s creators performed an evaluation of the architecture on Telos motes which focused on 
both communication and computational costs associated with transmitting and processing packets. 
MiniSec achieves a reduction in the security overhead of packets and requires only 3 bytes whereas 
TinySec requires 5 bytes. Any decrease in total packet size is beneficial in a sensor network environment 
where hardware resources are limited. It requires more energy and computational resources to process and 
communicate larger packets, and as such MiniSec ensures an overall decrease in those costs over 
TinySec. When comparing the total increase in communication overhead over the default TinyOS 
network stack, MiniSec only incurs an 8.3% increase while TinySec incurs a 13.9% increase [59]. Less 
overhead translates to less energy and computational resource consumption and thus increase the 
resources available to a mote. 
 Compared to TinySec, MiniSec boasts better energy consumption as well as better security 
provided at the cost of minimal increase in memory usage. MiniSec provides solutions to issues with both 
the TinySec and ZigBee protocols and as a result makes it an ideal potential candidate for usage in a body 
area network environment. As well, the MiniSec codebase is publicly available should it need to be ported 
or adapted to another platform. However, further work needs to be carried out in order to determine if 
MiniSec is a completely viable solution for application level security for a sensor network. Specifically, 
some areas of interest remain unanswered by this preliminary research: 
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1. MiniSec would likely need to be adapted for usage with this project’s body area network protocol 
and it is not known how difficult that process would be. 
2. MiniSec does not address the issues of key establishment or management, which are necessary 
for secure network communication. Research into compatible and secure keying solutions would 
be required if MiniSec were to be used. 
3. In a multi-hop sensor network environment, MiniSec does not address the issue of secure routing. 
Research into secure routing solutions would also be needed should MiniSec be utilized in a 
multi-hop network. 
 
D.2.3 TinyECC 
 
TinyECC is library designed for configurable usage of elliptic curve cryptography (ECC) 
operations in a wireless sensor network [62]. The goal of TinyECC, as described by the creators is to 
“provide a ready-to-use, publicly available software package for ECC-based PKC operations that can be 
flexibly configured and integrated into sensor network applications” [63]. TinyECC advertises an array of 
optimization options in the library that enable tweaking of performance based on the needs of the 
developer. Generally speaking, public-key cryptography has not been heavily utilized in sensor network 
protocols or applications due to the large overhead associated with it. TinyECC serves to provide a 
solution to that problem specifically tailored for usage in wireless sensor networks. 
Like TinySec and MiniSec, TinyECC was designed and developed for the TinyOS platform. It 
was written entirely in nesC with the exception of some in-line assembly code sections for sensor 
platform specific optimizations. Such sensor platforms include MicaZ [64], TelosB [65], Tmote Sky [66], 
and Imote2 [67]. TinyECC was tested on all the aforementioned sensor platforms. The library implements 
nearly every known optimization available for ECC operations and each optimization is controllable by a 
software switch. These optimization switches increase the configurability and flexibility of the library and 
enable the developer to make optimization decisions based on their specific application’s requirements. 
TinyECC offers three well-known ECC methods that have been proven to be secure: the Elliptic 
Curve Diffie-Hellman (ECDH) key agreement, the Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA), 
and the Elliptic Curve Integrated Encryption Scheme (ECIES). The library supports 128-bit, 160-bit, and 
190-bit elliptic curve domain parameters. An example given by the authors is that 160-bit ECC provides 
the same security as 1024-bit RSA. The benefit of these variants of existing ECC schemes is that they 
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enable smaller key sizes while still providing a similar level of security to what they were based on (i.e. 
DH and DSA). 
An evaluation of TinyECC was designed and executed by the library developers on the four 
sensor platforms mentioned earlier. In doing so, information such as performance, resource consumption, 
and optimization impacts were accrued. Their experiments consisted of measuring performance 
(execution time) and resource consumption (ROM, RAM, energy) metrics in two distinct cases for each 
optimization switch provided by the library. In the first case, with all other switches disabled, metrics 
were recorded with each switch enabled and disabled. In the second case, with all other switches enabled, 
the same metrics were recorded with each switch on and off. Detailed results such as individual 
optimization impacts, as well as the most computationally efficient, and most storage efficient 
configurations are provided. 
As it stands, it is not known whether TinyECC would be compatible or feasible for usage with the 
body area network protocol this project is developing. More research into TinyECC and how it performs 
on hardware used by Shimmer motes is necessary to determine if TinyECC is a viable solution for key 
exchange or encryption. 
Three major TinyOS-based and wireless sensor network oriented security protocols have been 
identified and briefly described. Other research on the subject such as the SPINS protocol [68] as well as 
some other TinyOS/nesC cryptographic libraries [69] [70] were looked at in addition. Areas of future 
work and research have been outlined in regards to each major protocol highlighted. While the focus of 
this project is not on implementing security via cryptography, we believe that future projects may focus 
on that problem. As such, this section serves to provide as a starting point for continued and more in-
depth research of existing protocols and solutions. Within the context of a body area network security is 
an unavoidable necessity and the libraries outlined may serve as solutions or starting points to achieve 
security. For example, it may be possible to utilize TinyECC in conjunction with another protocol such as 
TinySec or MiniSec in order to implement both secure key agreement as well as encryption and 
authentication within a wireless sensor network. Ultimately, the greatest limitations will likely not be 
incurred by the protocol itself, but by the hardware and resource limitations of the sensor platforms used. 
As sensor platform hardware technology continues to improve, the limitations of motes will likely 
decrease and enable more varied security solutions. 
